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The development of a theory of motivation in symbolic interactionism is traced, with particular reference to the work of G. H. Mead,
Kenneth Burke, C. W; Mills, Nelson Foote, and Ernest Becker.

Specific

attention is focused on comparing tpe original theoretical assumptions
of particularly Mead and Burke to the varying formulations of the prob
lems of motivation that were later developed by symbolic interactionists.
Specifically, it is argued that, primarily due to Burke's analysis, the
t.raditional practice of deterministically explaining human action as
being the result of variously imagined motives "in" people is,

i~

fact,

2'

. no explanation at· all but simply a variety of
tions dressed in causal vocabulary.

metapho~ical

redescrip

Rather than something "in" people

that determines 'behavior, Burke argued that motives' are a particular"
.kind of communication that people use to rationalize given actions in
specific

s~tuatioris.

Following these assumptions, C. W. Mills was later able to inte
grate Burke's analysfs with Mead's (et al.) theory of symbolic interac
,tionism.

However, as symbolic interactionism was later developed

varipus theorists reintroduced the deterministic bias into the
of motivation.

probl~m

A critique of this determinism is developed based on the

"fallacy of tautology."
It is finally argued that, as a kind of communication that inter
actants use, the problem of motivation alludes to a sense of "drama" in
social interaction in which individuals negotiate motives in order to
influence the behavior of significant others.

Thus, motives are seen to

derive their meaning problematically in terms of how others respond in
social interaction to an individual's avowed motive.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The first formulation of a theory of motivation that was amenable
to a truiy sociological perspective was developed in 1932, not by a
sociologist, but a literary critic and poet, Kenneth Burke.
.was published in 1935.
~ssembled

This work

A year prior to this a collection of lectures was

that had been delivered by a professor at the University of .

Chicago, George H. Mead.

Mead's work represented a pivotal development

of a sociological psychology concerning the nature. of "mind," "self," and
l
Itsociety," called symbolic interactionism.
This is not to say that Mead
was alone in this endeavor for·indeed, John Dewey, William James, Charles
Cooley, and James M. Baldwin, among others, also participated.

But Mead's

collection of lectures represented a major, if'pot the major effort in the
development of symbolic interactionism.

Moreover, 'it was Mead's collec

tion of lectures that was later employed as representing the basis of
symbolic interactionism, and that eventually was wedded to Burke's work on
motivation.
But this did not happen until 1940.

Interestingly enough, two major'

papers were published in 1940 both dealing with the problem of motivation
in sociology.

One was published in the American Journal of Sociology by'

Robert MacIver (1940), then at Columbia, entitled "The Imputation of
Motives."

The other pape.r was written at .the University Qf

Wisconsi~

by'

C. Wright Mills, then a doctoral candidate, entitled "Situated Actions
and Vocabulary of Motives."

This was published in a rival journal, the
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American 'Sociological Review.
Sociologically speaking, MacIver's paper

represe~t~d

the tradi

tional confusion and misunderstanding in the discipline toward the prob
lem o,f motives.

Basically, the notion of "motive ll and 'llcause" was still

confounded; motives

~ere

nants of behavior.

MacIver ,(1940:1-2), however, was sensitive to the

assumed to involve internal forces or determi

fact that, "The peculiar feature of the imputation of motives is that we
are asserting a nexus between an overt action and a purely sul?jective
factor that cannot be exposed to any kind of direct· scrutiny and that is
not, as such" manifest in the action."

But in spite of this embarrass

ment, MacIver encouraged sociologists not to give up on the notion of
motive.

He concluded by urging further

investigatio~

on

the impulses gen~rating social movements of all kinds, the senti
ments that characterize the various forms of group solidarity,
the foci of emotional attachments under different social condi
tions. . • • There is a sociology of emotion that is almost .
entirely unexplored and tha~ might throw much light on the prob
lem of motivation (MacIver, 1940:11-12).
Theoretically, C. Wright Mills appeared to settle this whole prob
lem between "cause" and "motives" by integrating Burke with Mead.

By

recognizing that motives are a special type of "lingual vocabulary," and
that language, "rather than expressing something which is prior and in
the person . . • is taken by other persons as an

indi~ator

of

futu~e

actions" (Mills, 1962:439), Mills developed a truly sociological theory
of motives.

Put simply:

Rather than fixed elements "in" an individual, motives are the
terms with which interpretation of conduct bl social actors
proceeds. This imputation and avowal of motives by actors are
social phenomena to be explained. . . . Motives are names for
consequential situations, and surrogates for actions leading to
them (Mills, 1940:~39-40) (emphasis in the original).
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I mentioned above that Mills t 1940 paper set,tled the issue between
"causes tl and ,"motives"; actually that is an over-statement.

Although

currently the issue is probably settled for most practicing sociologists,
~he controver~y is stiil raging in oth~r social science disciplines, '.

part~cularly psychology.2 It was not until as la~e as 1958 that a very
well received work by R. S. Peters (1958) grappled. with the distinction
between cause and motive from a grammatical and logical point of view,
and hopefully settled the issue in philosophy.
I.

THESIS FORMAT

Since 1940, a number of theorists have continued to develop the
problem of motivation within the larger development of symbolic interac
tionism.

However, as symbolic interactionism has evolved into a number

of different sub-types, I Kuhn (1967) counts seven], so too, the problem of
motivation has conceptually splintered.

At present the literature on

motivation is frequently confusing and ambiguous due to difference· between
the various sub-types of symbolic interactionism.

For instance, some

theorists speak of motives as a "special type of communicative conduct,1J
while others refer to motives as words.

Some refer to motives as proper

ties of situations; other theorists speak of them· as properties of social
structures.

In one sub-theory, motives a!e said to enter into action

only occasionally, while in another, action is always institutionally and
historically linked.

With these difficulties in mind, the purpose of

this thesis is to delineate the development of the problem of motivation
in the history of symbolic' interactionism.

The effort is considered

warranted on the .following counts:
1.

such a study has not yet been made;

4

2.

3.
4.

the literature in the sociology of motivation in symbolic
interactionism is frequently confusing and ambiguous due
to the differences between the various sub-types of the
theory;
the sociology of motivation itself is still a recent and
emerging field that can yet profit from greater attention;
the problem of motivation is squarely situated in address
ing one of the major problems of sociology in general-
"what is the nature of social action?"

The analysis will proceed along the following format.

First, the

wprks of James M. Baldwin, William James, and in particular George H.
Mead will be analyzed.to establish the original theoretical assumptions
of symbolic interactionism with special reference to the nature of '''mean
ing,"

"a~tion"

and "minded behavior."

~econdly,

Kenne't:h Burke's (1954)

Permanence and Change will be analyzed. since it was basically this:
treatise that C. Wright Mills integrated with symbolic interactionism.
Thirdly, the problem of motivation will then be traced as it was later
developed within symbolic interactionism.

Lastly, specific attention

will be focused on comparing the original theoretical assumptions .of
particularly Mead and Burke to the varying formulations of the problem
of motivation that were later developed by symbolic interactionists; this
comparison will afford the basis of critique of this later

developm~nt.

Specifically, it will be shown that, primarily due to the impact of
Bu~kefs

analysis, the traditional practice of deterministically explain

ing human action as being the result of variously imagined motives "in"
people is, in fact, no explanation at all but simply a variety of meta
phorical redescriptions dressed in causal vocabulary.
thing "in" people that determines behavior, Burke·

Rather than some

~rgued

that motives are

.a particular kind' of communication that people use to rationalize given

---

actions in
the

s~eci£ic

situations.

In

~erms.of

.

explaining action, therefore,

deterministic 'bias drops out of the explanation entirely, and the

5
mea~ing

of motives then becomes understood as a general problem of com

munication in social interaction generally.
Fol~owing

these assumptions, C. W. Mills was later able to inte

grate Burke',s analysis with Mead's (et al.) theory of symbolic interac
tionism, which is, par excellence, an understanding of action based on
symbolic communication. • However, it will be argued that, as symbolic
interactionism was later developed, various theorists, 'including Mills,
ironically" reintroduced the deterministic bias into the problem of moti
vation.

Rather than deriving their meaning from on-going social int.erac

tion, motives came to be seen still as features of communication to be
~ure,

but as

a particular kind

of communication that, in various ways

"induce,1t "control," and determine action in general.

Specifically,

rather than derive their meaning from on-going social interaction, motives
came to be understood as certain kinds of "forces" in communication that
in some way gave meaning and control to interaction.

Mead's emphasis

that meaning is derived and built up through on-going interaction is
therefore shifted from a position of primary importance to a position of
dependency on those "forces" imagined to give meaning to interaction.
The underlying thesis of this essay is that the meaning of all com
munication in general, including motives as one type of communicative
conduct, is created and sustained through on-going social interaction.
Moreover, because interaction is fundamentally problematic, the meaning
of communicative behavior, including motives, is also variable and prob
lematic.

Thus, it is argued, to suggest that meaning is given to inter

action by motives, rather than derive their meaning from interaction
itself, is fundamentally a contradiction to the basic assumptions of
symbolic interactionism.

Moreover, it is also argued, that to explain

w
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the meaning of interaction as being the result of
on-g~ing

interactipn itself is fundamentally
tautological.
.

goes as fOllows.
as

~nything

evi~ence

other than
The tautology
.

The meaning 'of a given behavior or interaction is used

of another phenomenon or object which can be arbitrarilY',

envi~ioned--norms)

roles, selves, or motives.

This object is conceptu

alized as an independent variable which the original interaction is then
argued to derive or be dependent on for its meaning.

But because, in

this line of reasoning, the dependent variable (meaningful action) 3. is
used both as evidence of the independent variable and then explained by
that variable, the argument is fundamentally circular and thus has no
, explanatory value.
Finally, it will be argued that motives should be understood as '
terms of interpretation that individuals use to rationalize questioned
behavior.

The problem of motivation, in this sense, alludes to a sense

of "drama" in social interaction in which individuals negotiate motives
in order to influence the behavior of significant others.

Thus, motives

are seen to derive their meaning problematically in terms of how others
respond
this

i~

social interaction to an individual's motive avowal.

standpo~nt,

From

the role of a sociologist as an observer of social

phenomena, is to describe the various techniques that interactants employ
in negotiating their situated interactions.

It will be argued that,

dramatistically, the imputation and avowal of motives is one such tech
nique that the sociologist should attempt to describe and understand.

CHAPTER II
G. H. MEAD'S ANALYSIS OF MEANING
The applicability of early symbolic interactionism to a sociologi-·
cal. theory of motivation was not in terms of what it had to say about
motivation but rather, in terms of what it had to say about meaning.
The reason for this is that Mead, along with William James and James
Baldwin; was arguing that the meaning of human behavior was socially
constituted, and thus it could not be ascertained by looking either
"behind" or "within" the organism for underlying reasons
instincts, drives, or emotions.

su~h

as

For instance, in 1892 James argued that

the "self" of the human organism, or that which man calls "me," is a
socially predicated value.
In its widest possible sense, however, a man's Me is the sum
total of all that he can call his, not only his body, and his
psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and
children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works,
his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account (James, 1968:41).
In the same sense, Baldwin argued in 1897 that the meaning of
thought itself was not to be discovered in purging'the organism in an
endeavor to find "reactive expressions" or "motor attitudes."

Baldwin

(1968: 62) argued, '.'My thought of self is in the main, as to its character
as a personal self, ,filled up with my thought of Others, distributed
variously as individuals. .

"

Baldwin (1968:165) even expanded this

. sociological sense of meaning to analyze the development of the child:
But see, in this more subtle give-and-take of elements for the
building up of the social sense, how inextricably interwoven the
ego and the alter really are! The development of the child's

8

personality eouid not go on at all without the constant modifi
cation of his sense of himself by suggestion of oth~rs. So he
himself, at every stage, is really in part some one else, even
in his own thought of himself. And then the attempt to get the
alter stript from elements contributed directly from his present
thought of himself is equally futile. He thinks of the other,
the alter, as his socius, just as he thinks of himself as the
other's socius: and the only thing that remains more or less
stable, through-out the whole growth, is the fact ~hat there ~s
a growing sense of self which includes both terms,~the ego and
the alter.
In short, the real self is a bipolar self, the social self,
the socius (emphasis in· the original).
,!S'
Again, the applicability of early symbolic interactionism to a
theory of motivation was in its rejection of the notion that the meaning
of human behavior could be found in these dated notions of motives or
instincts that, in effect, reduced the significance of behavior to a non
social plane.

Rather, the meaning of the organism was seen to be soci

ally constituted.

It was in this framework that Mead, in particular,

came tO,develop a theory of Itmind,1I "action" and tlself" within a socio
logical reference.
Mead examines this problem through an analysis of the meaning of a
gesture.

lithe term 'gesture' may be identified with these beginnings of

soc·ial acts which are stimuli for the response of other forms" (Mead,
1934:43).

In this sense gestures, including symbols, become meaningful

when "they implicitly arouse in an individual making them the same
responses which they explicitly arouse, or are supposed to arouse, in
other individuals, the individuals to whom they are addressed" (Mead,
1934:47).

Thus,

meaning is • . . not to be concerned, fundamentally, as a state·
of consciousness, or as a set of organized relations existing. or
subsisting mentally outside the field of experience into which
,they enter; on the contrary, it should be concerned objectively,
as having its existence entirely within the field itself. The
response of one organism to .the gesture of another in any given
social act i~ the meaning of that gesture ••• (Mead, 1934:78).

'9

It is important to note Mead's emph,asis here, on the role of
"response" in, the construction of meaning.

Meaning is

~rgued

to exist

~,

objectively within the field of experience only on the basis of the
reciprocity of response' of others to the gestur~s wit'hin a social' act..
In this sense, meaning is contingent upon'a "three:-fold relation" within
the social act:
this relation of the gest~re of one organism to the adjustive
response of another organism (also implicated in the given act)',
and to the completioR of the given act--a relation such that the
second organism responds to the gesture of the first as indica
ting or referring to the completion of the given act (Mead, 1934:
76-7) (emphasis in the original).
It goes without saying, therefore, that if meaning can be said to
exist objectively on the basis of the reciprocity of behavioral responses,
the absence of those responses implies that the interaction either comes
into question or must await future responses for the consummation of its
meaning.

And furthermore, meaning can not be said to exist if the

response of others within the given act is withheld or is of a nature
different ,than the prescriptions implied in the initiating response.
This is merely to recognize that meaning is problematic and variable; it
is, contingent on the adjustive responses of the other organisms within
the act. 4

I..

"MINDED BEHAVIOR"

Not only did Mead explicate the problem of meaning into a total,
social-behavioral point of view, he also expanded the issue into explor
ing what is meant by the no:tion, "mind."

Since meaning was now seen as

an objective, behavioral phenomenon, and not reducible to the "conscious"
states of the organism, or some other level, it was logical that Mead

10

als'o explicate the meaning of "mind" in behavior",l
Mead again not only returned to draw off some of
James and Baldwin; he expanded these concepts,
, "me," into a theory of mind.

1=-~rms,!

In doing

th~ ba~ic

especi~lly

s~,

arguments of
the notion of,

Parenthetically, it should also be noted

that this expansion of James' . notion of "me" represents Mead's most
significant contribution to symbolic interactionism (see Bolton, 1971).
As noted above, James and Baldwin depicted the "me" in the experi
ence of the organism as viewing self as a social object.

Mead (1934:38)

recognized this when he stated:
The individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but
only indirectly, from the particular standpoints of other indi
vidual members of the same social group, or from the generalized
standpoint of the social group as a whole to which he belongs.
But Mead makes a brilliant move further.

Through the human organ

ism '·s ability to use language, and therefore symbolize the gestures of a
given ,social' act,' the individual is able to "import" the conversation of
social gestures and therefore symbolically elaborate the organized,set of
responses that others hold toward him.

In other words, through man's

sYmbolic capacity, an individual can "take over" the attitudes or
-""J
JI
~

1
j

~

responses of others, hold them symbolically before h1m, as it were, and ,
thereby selectively respond to them.

This is what is meant by

th~

ability

i

,....
...~ \

V

of "taking the role of the other." The organized sets of attitudes of

J

the community that one internalizes therefore represent
the "metl,and is called the "generalized other."

one aspect of

Put succinctly, Mead

(1934:186) says:

I have been presenting the self and the mind in terms of a social
process, as the importation of the conversation of gestures into
the conduct of the individual organism, so that the individual
organism takes these organized attitudes of the others called out
by its own attitude, in the form of its gestures, and in reacting
to that response calls out other organized attitudes in the com

11

munity to which the·individual belongs. This process can be
characterized in a certain sense in terms of the "pt and the
"Me", the "Me tl being that group of organized attit\ldes to which
the individual responds as 'an "pt.
Mind is therefore an on-going communicative behavfor that parallels
the experience of communication, say, between two people except that it
is' internalized within the actor.

As in the case of two people, where.

one individual initiates communication through avowal of a gesture, and
mea~ing

then becomes established in terms of the other's adjustive

response, so too with minded behavior.

The "me" represents the organized

attitudes of the community; the "PI represents the resp0x:>-se to those" atti
tudes.

Mind is therefore "the individual importation of the social pro

cess" (Mead, 1934:34).
Perhaps Mead's interpretation of "minded behavior" can best be
exemplified by an analysis of what is meant by "intention." Due to the
ability of symbolically objectifying the response of one's self and
others, an individual can organize an "intended" line of action within
a situation.

Intentions, in this sense, are activities of symbolically

elaborating actions of a directed sort that the individual can anticipate
carrying out and thereby selectively respond to.

Intentions per se can

therefore be said to be aspects of an individual's "me"; that is, an
objectification of how one expects one's self to respond toward a given
goalo
The fact should be underscored, though, that as an activity, inten
tions are not a constant phenomenon "inlt individuals.
activities, "intending" can be engaged in or not.
th~t'not

all behavior is intentional.

Like all other

This is merely to note

For.instance, both Mead arid his

contemporary
Dewey . (1930) recognized that a considerable p.ortion of
.
action is habitual and carried out without intentional deliberation.
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More,over, in the

proc~ss

of carefully intending a particular behavior., a

whole host of other actions that the individual may be performing co
jointly

ar~

carried out without conscious control.

Thus it is argued that "intending" is one kind or aspect -of minded
behavior.

And like minded behavior, the meaning of an individual's

actions is not something"that resides "in" the individual; it ,becomes
established on'the basis of action itself.

In this respect, the meaning

of an intention is not given in and of the intention itself.

The meaning

of an individual's intention. is given by the individual's response to it.
Thus if actions are of a nature different than what was intended, the
$ignificance of the original intention is either meaningless or highly
ambiguous.

The point is, as Mead argued, meaning is an on-going product

of response and not a state of mind or consciousness (cf. Mead, 1934·:
80-1).

And because responses or actions can be variable, the meaning of

"mind" and "intention" is also problematic.
An~ther

example that can illustrate Mead's theory of mind is that

of "attitude." Although Mead defends the position that meaning is an
objective, behavioral phenomenon, he was very much opposed to the extreme
position of Watsonian behaviorism.

The latter position assumed that

because only overt behavior could be scientifically observed and analyzed,
covert processes such as "mind," or ttc9nsciousness," could therefore be
either ignored or denied to exist.

Mead (1934:6),on the other hand,

argued that "There is a field within the act itself which is not external,
but which belongs to

~he

act." Mead is of course referring to the field

of consciousness and attitudinal behavior.
argued:

For instance, Mead (1934:24)

13
..

'

We approach the distant stimulus with the ~nipulatory processes
already excited. We are ready to grasp the hamme:r before' we
reach it, and the attitude of manipulatory response directs the,
approach. What we are going to do determines the line of
approach and in some sense its manner.
By attitude, Mead refers to "the beginnings of social acts,".or
incipient acts.

As argued above, through the individual's ability 'to

symbolically objectify anticipated actions of others and one's self, one
can prepare future actions and.attempt to guide behavior accordingly.
This is not to argue, however, that the beginning stages of a social act
determine

the meanin& of the consummated act, for as has been argued,

the meaning develops as the action itself evolves.

In this respect,

Mead compares attitudinal behavior with hypothetical behavior, or
behavior consisting of the arousal of the individual toward a given ac
tion with an imagined or hypothesized consummation of the action., For
instance, Mead

(1938:~5)

sugg~sts,

a hypothetical character.

"Such an aroused future act has always

It is not until this initiated response is

carried out 'that its reality is assured."
sizing the

problem~tics

Obviously Mead is reempha

of action itself, and the constructional nature

of meaning in action, and not before it.

In this sense, an attitude or

hypothesis is there as a promise; "it becomes true when it fulfills its
promise" (Mead, 1938:103).
It is important to note that Mead's theory conceptualizes mind as
a dynamic process as opposed to a "condition" or a "state." As discussed
above, the meaning of'behavior is not something that resides "in behavior,"
or "behind" it; behavioral meaning becomes established in terms of the
response of one organism to the gesture of the other (or the organism's
response to itself).

In this same respect, it is the behavioral response

of the "I" to the organized sets of attitudes of the I'IMe" that establishes

14
,meaning between the two.
bas~d

ment

on response.

Meaning is an obj ective, be~ayip:ral dev~lop
Now just as the meaning between two individuals

is problematic and va~iable, being contingent on the nature of the
response of the other, so too, the meaning of minded behavior is contin
gent on the. respon,se of the "I" toward the "Me." Meaning is not a given.,
but must be

underst~od

of

and action.

~esponse

making this point.

processually as an on-goinglY'established product
Indee4, Mead is very careful and explicit in

Just as the response of the other person is somewhat

uncertain in, say,. dialogue, so too the response of the "I" toward the·
"Me" is problematic.

Mead (1934:176) explains it in this way:

I want to call' attention particularly to the fact that this
response of the "I" is something that is more or less uncertain.
The attitudes of others which one assumes as affecting his own
conduct constitutes the "me", and that is something that is
there, but the response to it is as yet not given. When one
sits down to think anything out, he'has certain data that are
there. Suppose that is a social situation which he has to
straighten out. He sees himself from the pOint of view of one
individual or another in the group. These individuals, related
~ll together, give him a certain sense of self. Well, what is
he going to do? He does not know and nobody else knows.
Stated somewhat more succinctly,

M~ad

(1934:178) elaborates:

The "me" represents a definite organization of the conununity
there in our own attitudes, and calling for a response, but the
response that takes place is something that just. happens. There
is no certainty in regard to it. There is a moral necessity but
no mechanical necessity for the act (emphasis added) ..
Mead is arguing an important point here.

Namely, there is no form

of determinism, mechanical or otherwise, that the "me" holds over the
"1."
tain.

The "I," as a response of the organism, is always somewhat uncer
Now some symbolic.interactionists have reacted to Mead's notion of

the "pr claiming that it is "vague," "mystical," and involving a ''mysteri
ous biology."

None of these claims are warranted.

Mead is simply paying

cognizance to an undeniable, empirical fact concerning human response:
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men bungle--constantly.

Even when all of the facts of any situation are

known, as in a well-rehearsed play, mistakes in actfng are still made.
There is nothing vague about this.

For instance, Mead notes the baseball

game where one individual is called upon to make a long pitch.
Now, it is the presence of those organized sets of attitudes
that constitutes the "me" to which he as an "I" is responding.
But what that response will be he does not know and nobody else
knows. Perhaps he will make a brilliant play or an error. The
response to that situation as it appears in his immediate experi
ence is uncertain', and it is that which constitutes the "I."
(Mead, 1934:175).
Mead maintained constant recognition of the fact that meaning is
problematic since it is

p~ocessually

contingent on the

of others,. and the uncertain responses of one I s self.

~ncertain

Mead t s

responses

class,i~

example ,of this is the absent-minded college professor who started to
d~ess

for dinner and found himself in his pajamas in bed:

, A certain process o~ undressing was started and carried out mech
anically; he did not recognize the meaning of what he was dOing.
He intended to go to dinner and found he had gone to bed. The.
meaning in his action was not present. The steps in this case
were all intelligent steps which controlled his conduct with
reference to later action, but he did not think about what he
was doing. The later actio~ was not a stimulus to his response,
b~t just carried itself out when it was once started (Mead, 1934:
72).

The significance of Mead's argument can be summarized in one state
ment:

there is a hiatus between words, thoughts, and actions. ' The rela

tionship between that "I" as responsive actions, and the "me" as 'the
organized collection of attitudes and symbols that the "I" responds to,
is not direct.

There is a gap.

The problem of this hiatus will come up

again in an analysis of Nelson Foote (1951) and 'E. Becker (1962a; 1964b).
But Mead's recognition of this hiatus is undeniable.
argued that the "Itt and the ''Me''

He continuously
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ar.e separated in the process but they belong together in the
sense of· being parts of a whole. They are separated and yet
they belong together .. The separation of the "I" and the "Me",
is not fictitious. They are not identical, for, ~s I have
said, the "I" is something that is never entirely calculable.
The "Me" does call for a certain sort of an "I" in so far as
we meet the obligations that are given in conduct itself, but
the "I" is always something different from what the situation
itself calls for (Mead, 1934:178).
II.

ACTION

Mead's account of the uncertainty of behavior has been
by some as being vague and unexplainable.

criti~ized

Again, this is not the case.

Mead does provide an explanation and it is centrally involved in his
processual theory of meaning.

Meaning is based on response, and there

fore, in interactional terms, it is created during the course of, and
on the basis of, action.

Meaning is not inherent in the interactants,

say, or before the interaction; it develops during the interaction on
the basis of reciprocal action itself.

Or, with the individual, meaning

does not exist within him, but it develops on the basis of his responses
to the organized sets of attitudes or objects that he is singling out.
With this understanding, an explanation for the uncertainty of action is
forthcoming, and Mead provides it.
It is only as we act that we become aware of the meaning of our
actions.

As Mead (1934:175-7) says.

The "I" is his action over against the social situation within
his own conduct, and it gets into his experience only after he
has carried out the act. Then he is aware of it·.
The
response enters into his own experience only when it takes
place ".
Put another way, "There again I cannot turn around quick. enough to catch.
myself"

(~ead,

1934:174).

In this sense, what we frequently believe to

be the meaning of our actions takes place largely as memory images.

I .
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As action flows, the· meaning can be symbolically objectified, as it were,
but until the action is largely over, there is only

sp~culation.

an object of the meaning of our actions, therefore,

i~

delayed and after the fact.

Making

always somewhat

This is because of the processual nature of

meaning being contingent on responses, pot before responses.
I.

It is only after we have said-the word we are saying that we rec
ognize ourselves as the person that said it, as this particular
self that says this particular thing; it is only after we have
done the-thing that we are going to do that we are aware of what
we are doing. However carefully we plan the future it always is
different from that which we can previse, and this something that
we are continually bringing in and adding to is what we identify
with the self that.comes into the level of our experience only in
the completion of the act (Mead, 1934:203)( emphasis added).
Thus we see that one's actions

never be fully controlled because

~an

they are not totally comprehended during action ifself.

This is because

the meaning of our actions requires the response of the "I" before it can
be said to behaviorally exist.
position that the "I" is
our actions problematic.

~n

And thus, it is because of this peculiar

that makes the comprehension and control of

"It is because of the "I" that we say that we

are never fully aware of what we are, that we surprise ourselves by our
own actions" (Mead, 1934:174).
This brings us back to the hiatus between words and actions that
Mead depicts so poignantly.

It is because of this hiatus and the elusive

nature of behavioral

that makes the comprehension of one's actions

me~ning

by and large a product of memory.
.

As Mead (1934:176) said, "And when the
.

response takes place, then it appears in the field of experience largely
as a memory image.

We are doing something, but to look back and

see what we are doing involves getting memory images." As such, action
and meaning must be understood as on-goingly problematic,

a~d

the potenti

ality of discrepancies, errors, and blunders in action is'always a latent
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possibility.

,It is, in fact, around these issues that the problem of

motivation became introduced to symbolic ,interactionism.

For the sO,cio

logical significance of motives is not that they "cause" behavior .. but
they "justify" or rationalize its discrepancies in social interaction.

CHAPTER III
KENNETH BURKE AND THE PROBLEM OF MOTIVES
Mead clearly detailed the symbolic foundation of men's actions;
their meaning is to be found within the symbolic interaction of gestures
and reciprocating responses.

Moreover, this same social process is

integral to the behavior of the individual.

Specifically,. by "internal . . ,

izing" the conversation of social gestures and thereby symbolically
elaborating the organized sets of responses that others hold toward him,
the individual can act in terms of anticipated
others.

mea~ings

or responses from

This, however, does not imply that those anticipated responses

will occur, but that more than likely they will.

It is thus in terms of

.the "generalized other" that the individual also possesses a personal
sense of "self," or a knowledge of how one can expect others to act toward
him.
Burke adheres, to this same understanding.
men act in terms of "orientations,"

wh~ch

In any given situation

amount to a given set of antici

pations (expectations) of how the environment (including others) will
,respond toward them.

As Burke (1954:18) says, people act in terms of

a sense of relationships, developed by the contingencies of ex
perience; this sense of relationships is our orientation; our
orientation largely involves matters of expectancy, and affects
our choice of'means with reference to the future
Thus Burke (1954:18) argues that all men are critics especially in the
sense'that "man attempts' to extend the range Gf his responses and increase
their accuracy by deliberately verbalizing the entire field or orientation
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and interpretation."
Burke also underscores the fact that, while the tJgeneralized
other" or one's orientation provides a sense of expectancy toward one's
environment, this does not imply that responses actually coincide.

A~

Burke (1954:6-7) suggests,
Orientations can go wrong.
Thus it will be seen that the
devices by which we arrive at a correct orientation may be quite
the same as those involved in an incorrect one. We can only
say tha~ a given objective event derives its character for us
from past experiences having to do with like or related events.
Burke (1954:111) also notes that "we are all necessarily involved in the
momentous discrepancies 'of our present order."
In spite of the problematic, however, Burke argues along with Mead
that individuals attempt cognitively to erect a conception of our
and our world as coherent and approachable.
tendency as "piety";

ft • • •

"s~lf"

Burke (1954:74) terms'this

piety is a system-builder, a desire to round

things out, to fit experiences together into a unified whole.

Piety is

the sense of What properly goes with what" (emphasis in the original).
Thus piety is the tendency, as noted above, of the individual deliberately
verbalizing the "entire field of orientation" and interpretation.

Burke

(1954:75) carries this notion of piety even further:
I would even go further in trying to establish this notion of
piety as a' response which extends through all the texture of
our lives but has been concealed from us because we think we
are so thoroughly without religion and think that the "pious
process" is confined to the sphere of churchliness.
It is within the notions of "orientations" and "piety" that Burke
introduces the problem of motivation.

Motives are

subdivision~

of orien

tations, espe'cially with reference to the orientation one has within
specific or co-joined situations.

Specifically, motives are "terms of

interpretation" or rationalizations that are used by the individual to
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explain his cenduct with respect to his orientation in a given situation.
As Burke (1954:18) says,
in the human sphere, the subject of expectancy and the judgemen~
as to what is proper in conduct is largely bound up with the
subject of,mqtives, for if.we know why people do as they do, we
feel that we know what to expect of them and of ourselves • . .
(emphasis in the original).
.
As suchJ mptives are rationalizations of one's conduct within given situ
ations with reference to the individual's orientation.
The question then becomes, to what to motives refer?

As being

aspects of orientations; motives refer to or represent "short-hand" terms
for orientations within situations.

For instance, Burke (1954:31) gives

the following example:
A man informs us he "glanced back in suspicion." Thus suspicion.
was his motivation. But suspicion is a word for designating a
complex set of signs, meanings, or stimuli not wholly in con- .
sonari~e w~th one another. . . .
By the word "suspicion" he was
referring to the situation itse1f--and he would invariably pro
nounce himself motivated by suspicion whenever a similar pattern
of stimuli recurred.
When avowed, motives therefore rationalize conduct by referring to the
contingencies of a given situation, as these contingencies are interpre
ted via one's orientation.

They function to rationalize by conveying to

significant others one's interpretation of the contingencies within a
situation.

Burke notes that when one is asked why he closed the window,

the motive-rationalization most conveniently used refers to the contin
gencies inherent in the situation:

"because the room is cold."

As such,

a motive amounts to nothing more than a rationalistic interpretation of
a situation.
This understanding should lend a distinction between an individual's
intentions and his motives.
the same.

Typically the two are believed to be one and

However, as was explained above, intentions represent a
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subj ectively felt sense of direction within an individual, as,suming, ,of
course, that the individual is in. fact "intending."

A~

an activity,

intentions involve symbolically objectifying what one will do in a par
ticular situation with respect to a given goal.

But '''intending'' a

particular $oal does' not automatically insure successful action toward
the .goal.

Indeed, whether or not the intention is meaningful is deter-',

mined by the nature of the responses to it.

Naturally there is, at

least potentially, a slip between what one intends and what one does.
There are instances where actions do not achieve their goal, or even do
not appear to be goal oriented.
tions~t

It is conunonly'in such cases that '''ques

arise by significant others requesting an explanation for the',

observed conduct.
are introduced.

It is in such instances 'that

motive-justification~

As rationalizations, avowed motives act'to explain the

individual's orientation within a given situation and thereby
the signi£icant audience involved the questioned conduct.

justi~y

to

In this sense,

avowed motives attempt to normalize the conduct of the situated actors
(see

p.

65).

But note that the crucial variable involved in whether a

motive justification is accepted is not whether the avowed motive is the
same as the individual's intentions (assuming, again, that the person is
indeed intending), but rather whether the rationalization satisfies the
expectations of the social audience.

The emphasis here is on whether the

audience accepts the motive, and not on a congruence between what an
individual intends (if he intends anything) and what he avows.

Indeed,

it may be the case that the individual's intentions are altogether differ
ent than his, avowed motives.
motives and intentions.

But this is exactly the distinction between

Motives are used to justify behavior to social

audiences by appealing to the contingencies in situations.

But one can
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not explain an individual's intentions On the basis of his rationaliza
tion.

For instance, an avowed motive may be

us~d

to pacify a question

ing audience, and yet at the same time obfuscate the individual's actual
intentions.

Or, an avowed motive may be employed to rationalize a given'

behavior that was not itself intended but yet called into question by
others.
Thus motives and intentions must be understood as altogether
different phenomena.

The latter problem is a subjectively felt sense

of direction that the individual mayor may not possess.

A motive is

strictly a feature of inter-personal communication in general.

As a

lingual term, a motive functions to justify questioned conduct to
ficant others.
~ot

s~gni-

But on the basis of a rationalization of conduct one can

determine an individual!s intention.

This is not to suggest that in

everyday conduct significant others do not infer intentions from avowed
motives.

But then it is not uncommon for significant others to be

shocked at a later date to discover that one's avowed motives were not
one's intentions.
As opposed to the traditional notions of ulterior causes or forces
acting within the individual such as drives or even intentions, motives
are terms of communication or interpretation that rationalize one's con
duct if or when it 'becomes questioned by others.
Any given situation d'erives its character from .the entire frame
work of interpretation by which we judge it. And differences in
our ways of sizing up an objective situation are expressed sub
jectivelY'as differences in our assignment of motive (Burke, 1954:
35) .'

The function of motives therefore should become quite obvious.
While through acts of piety individuals may attempt. verbally or cognita
tively to build coherent and

all~embracing

orientations toward the world,
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surprises~ accidents~

foundation.

Motives~

and discrepancies constantly
as rationalizations for

threat~n

actions~

their very

function inter

pretatively to bridge the gap between what others expect and what happens.

I.

PERSPECTIVE BY INCONGRUITY

If motives are merely rationalizations, what then lies deepe,r that
can explain the reasons for an individual's behavior?
tion of both the skeptic and the scientist.

This is the ques

Burke's answer is th,t the

only "reasons" that can be further specified as explaining the benavior
of the individual are simply more interpretations or

rationalization~.

The basis of man's behavior is symbolic interpretation within interaction
of other's and one's environment.

What is one man's motive therefore can

be interpreted by another, man as merely his rationalization.

But what

can be inferred to lie deeper amounts to nothing more than another interpr~tation

or rationalization.

Burke calls the reinterpretation or translation

~f

another man's

motives a Ifperspective by incongruity." This merely involves ignoring
the rationalization or motives offered by an individual and interpreting
his behavior within a context wholly incongruent with the individual"s
context.
either

Perspective by incongruity is usually accomplished through,

metaphor~

analogy, or laW-like generalizations.

In this respect

the relatively modern philosophic stance of positivistic science iS,by
and large based on perspective by incongruity, just as ancient mystics.
As Burke (1954:222) explains:
The identity between motives and situations should suggest why
the modern science of statistics tend to turn up conclusions
of a strongly mystical cast. By examining a multitude of situ
ations, individually distinct, ,the scientist attempts statisti
cally to extract a generalization common to all. The mystic .
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makes somewhat the same attempt by looking within and naming as
the ultimate motive a quality of experience common to all"
This is not to infer, however, that Burke is unaware of the possi
~

ble value of perspectiv.e by incongruity. ' Indeed, he recognizes that,.
"

whether it be the ancient shaman, Witch-doctor, or

the..'m~dern

psychoanal

yst, psychologist, or psychiatrist--substitution of a given motive and
the bestowal on the individual of a new vocabulary of motives can have
.pronounced effects, either therapeutically or detrimentally.

For

instance, Burke (1954: lS3) addresses himself to the phenomenon of '-'.exor...
cism by misnomer":

"The notion ,of perspective by incongruity would

suggest that one casts out devils by misnaming them.

It is not the

naming in itself that does the work, but the conversion downward implicit
in such naming" (emphasis in the original).

Indeed, the contemporary

work of psychoanalysts bears evidence that, in some cases, effective
therapy

ca~

result by the substitution of one vocabulary-for another.

(In some cases it can not.)
But the point that Burke is making is that, if Qnels task is actu
ally to understand the meaning of human behavior, one must deal directly
with the behavior and vocabulary of motives of the individual himself.
Misnaming involves misconceiving.

Specifically, first, men act in and

interpret situations on the basis of their own orientation or logic.
Therefore, to doubt the credibility of an individual's motive-rationali
zation for conduct is just simply to negate the fact that people do their
own "minding."

B'urke (1954:21) argues:

To explain one's conduct by the vocabulary of motives current
among one's group is about as deceptive as giving the area of
a field in the accepted terms of measurement. One is simply
interpreting 'the ,only vocabulary he knows. One is stating his
orientation, which involves a vocabulary of ought and ought
not, with attendant'vocabulary of praiseworthy and blameworthy.
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Secondly, if a man explains his conduct within th~'logic of the
only vocabulary he is familiar. with, it can not
rationalizations or logic are invalid or f1awed.

~e

argued that his
Again .Burke (1954:85) ~

argues that even the "primitive" orientations of savages is as "realtl·to
them as conventional logic:
As a matter of fact the savages behave quite logically, acting
on the basis of causal connections as established by the tribal
rationalizations. We may offer ground for questioning the.
, entire rationalistic scheme as tested by our own technique of
testing~-but we can not call a man illogical for acting on the
basis of what he feels to be true.
Finally, misnaming or translating involves misconceiving the orien
tation of the individual's behavior in that the very quality most charac
terist~c

of

people~-their

ability to interpret and choose--is ignored.

For instance, whether it be by the mystic or the scientist, through. trans-.
lation or reinterpretation of an individual's vocabulary of motives,
those motives

~re

invariably seen as a func'tion of, ulterior or

causa~

forces. For instance, a scientist or a mystic would interpret any given
act of an individual not on the basis of his own interpretation; rather,
a plethora of forces working on the individual would be introduced, 'rang
ing from "spells,", "devils," "libidinous drive energy," to "drives,tt
"instincts," unorms," "roles," "social structures," ad infinitum, ad
nauseum.

Burke (1954: 218) argu,es that, whatever the

ratio~ality

of the

translation may be, it tends,
to shape its accounts of the universal process without regard
for the most characteristic patterns of individual human experi
ence: the sense of acting upon something rather than of being
acted upo~ bX something. The spontaneous words of human motiva
tion all imply the element of choice; but the scientific (or
mystical) words imply compulsion. All causal schemes for ex
plaining our actions begin by eliminating the very quality
which most strongly characterize our own feelings with regard
to our actions (emphasis in the original).
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Finally, an attempt to determine the "real" meaning of an indivi
dual's behavior through perspective by incongruity is ultimately futile.
This is simply because translation can go on into infinite regression;
it has no necessary end.

Behavior can be interpreted through metaphor

and analogy in an endless number of ways; who is to determine which
translation is more "real" than another, especially in relation to the
in4ividual's avowed vocabulary of motives.
To say a man's intentions were in turn shaped by prior factors
is simply to open oneself to an infinite regress, which the
orthodox scheme of scientific causality avoids solely by trun
cating its speculations. It stops at a convenient point, and
interprets the convenience as cosmic reality (Burke, 1954:23).
The evidence of this fact is rampant.

There exists today a HBabel"

of interpretations of human behavior each competing with one another.
"Such interpretative schemes, varying in their scope and thoroughness,
seem limited only by the time and industry of the heuristically-minded-
and our examples can be chosen at random" (Burke, 1954:117-8).
'Burke argues therefore that motives should be understood as sub
divisions of an individual's orientation to his environment, particularly
situations.

Specifically, motives are "terms of interpretation"

o~

rationalizations that are used by the individual to justify his conduct
within situations to significant others.
"causes" or "determinants" of action.

As such, motives do not involve

They are rationalizations of

actions that function as short-hand terms for situations.

CHAPTER IV
AN EXCURSIS ON CAUSE AND DETERMINISM IN
SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM:' R. S. PETERS
The sociological significance of motives, especially as developed
by Burke, is that they are terms of interpretation within situations
that function to rationalize an individual's behavior.

In this sense,

motives are not 'to be understood as causal or deterministic forces that
control an individual's behavior.

In an extended sense then, motives

are theoretically relevant to only a problematic or indeterministic
theory of, action and meaning.

Thus the direct applicability of G. H.

Mead's analysis of meaning, "minded behavior," and action. (specifiCallY,
Mead understood "minded behavior," or the dialogue between the "I",and
"Me" as involving an ant'icipation by the individual of the responses of

)

significant others (including one's self) within a given field of action)

l~

But Mead forcefully stressed the variable and problematic features
involved in the establishment of meaning.
,?ri

Since meaning is contingent

the reciprocal and over-lapping responses of others (or the "I" toward

the "Me") which are not guaranteed, the meaning of
problematic and it involves indeterminate features.
of motives to Mead's theory of meaning and action.

~ction

itself is

Thus the relevance

I~ecause

the meaning

of action is situationally problematic, and in some situations is never
established, motives, as terms of interpretation, function to rationalize
and justify the behavior when it is questioned by significant

others~-

2~

In 1958, R. S.

Pet~rs

explicitly analyzed
probl~m

minance with respect to the
formulate a general

crit~que

of all

th~s

of motivation

feature'of indeter

a~d ~as

able then to

determinis~ic t~e~~ies

of human

action .
.Along, with Burke, Peters (1958:28) argues that "motives are a par
ticular 'class of reasons.

Many sorts of things can be reasons for:

actions, but motives are reasons of a par1;:icular sort."

First, Peters

,(1958':31) argues that motives relate to action only in situations where

'actions are questionable and need to be justified:
motive is not necessarily a discreditable reason for acting,
but it is a reason asked for in a context where'there is a
suggest10n that it might be discreditable. The demand is for
justification, not simply explanation (emphasis in the origi
nal).

,A

Secondly, motives' are reasons that assign a goal for action,that
allude to an individual's orientation within a situation (like Burke',s
"shorthand terms for situations"):
If we ask for a manls reason for doing something, the implica
tion is that he is acting in no untoward way. His behavior is·
within the framework of some rule-following purposeful pattern"
but it is not clear which rule or which purpose it falls under
(Peters, 1958:33-4).
Lastly, Peters argues that motives assign the reason why a person
is acting.
By this is meant that the goal which is quoted to justify a
man's action must also be such that reference to it actually
explains what a man has done.
The motive must be the
reason why he did whatever he did (Peters, 1958:34) (emphasis
in the original).
Peters' analysis of motives thus compliments

Bu~ke's,

although

Peters tends to emphasize the central importance of a "question" arising
within the situation that calls for a justification.

At this point, how

ever, by combining both Burke and Peters, a formal definition of motives

...
ooIIIIl.,
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is forthcoming:

A motive is a justificatory reason in interactional

contexts where behavior is being judged by others., It refers to a
directed disposition toward a goal relative to one's orientation in a
situation that explains
I.

~

reason for the action.

A CRITIQUE OF CAUSE AND DETERMINISM

From this conceptual understanding of the problem of motives,
Peters was able to formulate a general critique of causal or determinis
tic explanations of human action.

The problem of action has tradition

ally pivoted around the question:

"how does the directedness of behavior

come to be?"

Peters (1958:38) argues that, since motives function to

justify behavior by assigning

a goal

toward which action is directed,

many observers have attempted Ira causal interpretation of the logical
force of the term."

Specifically,

It looks like an analysis of the concept of "motive" of a sort
that 'implies that whenever we explain an action by reference to
a motive we both assign a reason ,or goal and a cause. But are
both elements of this ostensible analysis equally necessary
(Peters, 1958:38-8) (emphasis in the original)? "
Obviously not; the causal problem is simply an inference made by
the observer that in no way is indicated by either behav,ior that is
observed to be directed, or behavior that is justified by a motive as be
ing directed.

Basically, the attempt to assign causal or deterministic

force to either the directedness of behavior that is observed or explained
by a motive is on highly questionable grounds.

This is so, Peters argues,

-

because the inferred causal or deterministic explanation amounts simply
to redescription of a tautological
the directedness of one's

a~count

behavior can

b~

of the behavior.

~or

instance,

observed or avowed by an

individual as an attempt to control the conduct of other people around
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him.) Acausal

or deterministic interpretation can

be.inf~rred

from this

observed behavior or motive-avowal as involving, say, a need to dominate
others.

But Peters (1958:20) argues that, all too often this type of

functional or end-state explanation is redescriptive rather than explana
tory ••• "

For instance, with respect to the example above, "what is

the condition [or need] restored apart from that of the presence of others
being dominated (Peters, 1958:20)1

Peters (1958:20) argues that

in the absence of specific states required to define what con
stitutes the [need], it becomes entirely metaphysical . • •
Indeed in such cases need-reduction looks like a redescription'
of goal-seeking in terms which have the normative function of
stressing the importance of conventionally prescribed pursuits.
·It is a justification masquerading as a high-level explanation.
The issue here is one of "tautology." The directedness of action
can be either 'observed, or if questionable, explained by the individual
through motive avowal.

But any causal force that is attached toward the

observed behavior or the avowed motive is merely an inference created by
the observer.

Furthermore, this causal inference of the observer con

stitutes nothing more than a redescription of the actual behavior, except
in deterministic'terms.

This is the basis of tautology:

that which is

used as evidence of something is then explained by that something.

For

instance, an observed behavior' (dominating others) is used as evidence
of some term (a need, etc.) that is then explained by that term.

As

Peters argues, this is redescription or tautology, and its explanatory
value is nil (see Stone, 1970).
Causal or deterministic explanation of the directedness of behavior
is marked by another discrediting characteristic.

Namely, not only is

deterministic argument fundamentally tautological, but the inferred "cause"
can vary among an infinite number of imagined sources.

As Burke

~rgues,
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infi~ite

causal explanation involves the possibility of
~gYJ bein~

regress.

Tautol

fundamentally metaphysical, can enumerate' an infinite number

. of "causes" that affec:t the behavior, from "devils," IIneeds," to social
'''norms,'' and "roles." The range of possibilities is limited only by
the imagination of the theorist.
Peters

un~erscores

this point by a similar argument.
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And lastly, causal or deterministic argument

is fundamentally futile since all of the conditions can never be speci
fied or controlled that would demonstrably permit observation of the
effect of one variable on another.
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The

over-rid~ng

point, however, and one that underlies the entire

critique of causal explanation, is that in daily life individuals man
age to comprehend and control their respective behavior, not via general
theories-or causal explanations, but by ad hoc or situationally speci
fied accounts.

On

th~

basis of motive-avowal behavior typically flows

smoothly and finds justification within the contingencies of situations
themselves.

As such, ad hoc explanation in daily life is efficacious

and germane.
When we Ilaymen] offer explanations of human behavior, we are
seeing that behavior as justified by the circumstances in which
it occurs. In appealing to reasons for acting, motives, pur
poses, intentions, desires, and the cognates, which occur in
both ordinary and technical discussions of human doings, we
exhibit an action in the light of circumstances that are taken
to entitle or warrant a person to act as he does (Louch, 1969:

4).
II.

DETERMINISM IN SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM

In the realm of science, however, ad hoc explanations of,human
behavior will not suffice.

Indeed, the task of all behavioral science,

including sociology, is an attempt to transcend the ad hoc and formulate
generalization of human behavior within the parameters of a general
philosophy of science.

Specifically, sociology, in formulating theories

of action, has been concerned with theories of behavior that not only
theoretically generalize across situations, but also attempt to predict
and explain behavior.

It is because of this that

istic theories of behavior have arisen.
respect to

~ny

1aw~like>

or determin

As Louch (1969:40) argues, with

philosophy of science,

The test of explanation is its scope; the number of instances
which can be seen to follow from it is a clear and objective
way of assigning plus marks. To admit ad hoc explanations, on
the other hand, is to allow instances of proper explanations
which do not meet any particular- standard.
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In addition to the problem of scope or
problem of

prediction~

g~nerality~

however, is the

This involves what can be roughly coined as

"variable analysis"; changes in specified variables are used to predict
changes in other variable, thus involving a 'clear deterministic bias.
Thus, as Blumer (1967:89) argues,
The conventional procedure is to identify something which is pre
sumed to operate on group life and treat it as an independent '
variable, and then to select some form of group activity as the
dependent variable. The independent variable is put at the begin
ning part of the process of interpretation and the dependent
variable at the terminal part of the process.
Needless to say, much of symbolic interactionism has not remained
aloof from this practice; due to a reverence and preoccupatiqn toward'the
canons of a respectable science, symbolic interactionists since Mead have
developed a number of deterministic or law-like theories that generalize
about the nature of human doings.
ways.

This has been justified in a number of

Kuhn (1967:48-9) flatly argues that, "This internalization of

.

,

language and the concomitant internalization of the role of the other has,
in the Meadian description, nothing in it inconsistent with strict regu
larity or determinism."

Kuhn also footnotes Swanson (1961:327) as say

ing, "Mead's account [of conduct] ••• is not opposed, in principle; to
a deterministic view of behavior." However, Kuhn (1967:49) does recognize
that Mead indicated that "the "I" is impulsive and essentially unpredict
able--and furthermore that the "I" is the initiating, acting aspect of
the self."

But Kuhn (1967:49) excuses away these assertions so funda

mental to Mead by arguing that Mead's arguments were "elusive" due to the
fact that he orally presented his philosophy as opposed to writing it,
and that therefore, "It is never completely clear whether he meant only
that the I is subjectively unpredictable or that it is indeterminate in
a scientific sense. rrS

As was clearly argued above, Mead explained that
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the response of the ttl" was both subjectively uncer-t,ain (one 'surP:t: ises
an~ scie~tifically

,one's self), and ;hat this can be ,empirically
observed:
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Soc refers to a social variable
Self refers to a self variable
Al refers to an immediate antecedent variaple
A2 refers to an antecedent but distal var~aple
C refers to consequent variable
Beh. refers to behavior
Solid arrow indicates a determinate causal process
(Kuhn, 1967: 50)
While it is not our intent (nor even a possibility within the'
limited objectives of this essay) thoroughly to treat each theory with
regard to its own idiosyncracies or persuasion,

~uhn's

diagram will at

least afford the basis of a general understanding and critique of

deter~

ministic symbolic interactionism.
Determinism enters symbolic interactionism through a very simple
modification of Mead's basic premises concerning the relationship between
the til'·! and the "Me."

Specifically, instead of "taking the role of the
7
/
other," the individual is seen to be "taken by the, role of the other .-It

This is accomplished by hypostatizing the "Me," and further engendering
it with powers to manipulate and govern the response of the "I."

In this

sense the "Me" is made into an object or a collection of objects that in
scientific verbiage can be referred to as an objective variable.

As in

role theory, the "Me" becomes a collection of objects such as expectations,
norms, and rules that direct the response of the "I."

Or~

in reference

group theory, the "Me" becomes an object such as an organized collection
of attitudes, values, mores, Jand folkways

re~ative

to a particular group

that, as Shibutani (1967) says, acts as a "frame of reference" in direc
ting the response of the "I."

In early socialization theory the "self"

was typically regarded as a function of "roles," or as Backman and "Secord
(1968:289) say, "This linkage has for the most part taken the form of
role as the independent -variable and self as the dependent variable."

.J
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Now, however, "self theorists" have

engender~d

"self" as a more perma

nent object that can be argued to determine its own role:

~

The reverse of this fashioning of self by role may take two
forms: role selection and role portrayal. In role selec
tion, a person chooses roles that allow him to behave in a
manner compatible with self; in role portrayal, when the role
provides wide latitude for enactment, he favors the portrayal
that is most consistent with self (Backman and Secord, 1968:
289) (emphasis in the original).
As this latter example indicates, the variables or objects in
deterministic logic are interchangeable and relatively arbitrary; selves
can be a function of roles, or reference groups can be a function of
selves.
The remarkable flexibility' of such schemes is due to the fact that
their logic is tautological.

Again we can use some other studies by

Backman and Secord (1961; 1965) to demonstrate this.

Their.studies have

been "guided by a social-psychological approach to personality, which
assumes that stability and change in an individual's behavior over time
is a function of stability or change in his relations with other persons"
(Backman and Secord, 1968:289).

But is not a relationship toward other

people the way one behaves toward them?

Through tautology, however, the

"relationship" becomes a thing in itself, just as "roles,1t "reference
groups," and "selves," become a thing in themselves.
as follows:

The logic proceeds

a given behavior is used as evidence of another phenomenon

or object which can be

~rbitrarily

stated--norms, roles, selves, refer

ence groups, sub-groups, whatever.

This'object is then made into an

independent variable and the original behavior is then argued to be its
derivative.

Douglas (1967:241) argues this same point except in

of sociologica,l theories in general:

ter~s
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[TheQrists] assume that the observable phenomena are representa
tive of .their theoretical categories. Such analyses of social
phenomena really tell us nothing of a scientific nature: they
consist primarily of merely imposing upon the immediately
observable phenomena • . • an abstract set of assumptions about
the nature of society, assumptions which can be applied any
where to any social phenomena.
The point is, though, that through tautology the independent and depend
ent variable amount to one and the same
recast, divided, and hypostatized.

thing~

except conceptually

In this sense deterministic theories

in symbolic interactionism are "sustained not by evidence, but by the
interdependence in meaning of the terms out of which • • • laws are
formed" (Louch, 1969:14).

Moreover, as Louch (1969:12-13) argues,

We understand the verbiage of the superstructure a little better
when we see what count as instances of his terms and rubrics.
In this sense the theory has no explanatory power; and as a
description is unnecessarily complex.
The only significance of sociological tautologies is that of a "surprise
[that] arises only in that what we know already about human activities
can be re-phrased in this terminology and classificatory system" (Louch,
1969:12).

8

Deterministic theories in symbolic interactionism can therefore be
seen as involving a strong mystical cast.

Through tautology, norms, roles,

selves, and other objects are argued ·to exist and in fact determine
behavior.

Yet, except for the actual behavior how can one observe norms,

roles, selves, or frames of reference?

One can not, for they are a

product of theoretical abstraction and tautology.
unreal as the abstractions of mystics:

They are as real or

demons, devils, and curses are

equally unobservable.
Th~s

brings us back to Burke's notion of "perspective by incongruity."

An individual's behavior can be.interpreted or translated in an infinite
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yari~ty

of causal arguments, primarily through the use of redescription

and tautology.

To suggest that a man's actions were determined by prior

factors simply opens one's self up to "infinite regress" and speculation.
Tautology is not the only discrediting feature of deterministic
explanations in symbolic interactionism.

In the process of redescribing

behavior, tautology also conceptually ignores and obliterates features
of behavior that do not fall within the confines of its focus.

Specifi

cally, in delineating the interaction between the dependent and independ
ent variables, the intervening process drops out.
pr~cisely

What is left out is

what Mead attempted theoretically to establish; namely, that

meaning is processually contingent on the over-lapping and reciprocity
of responses of individuals within behavioral situations.

Let us look

at the latter problem first, that of situations.
In deterministic symbolic interactionism, situations are relatively
unproblematic and inconsequential.

The meaning of the behavioral inter

action is seen to be contingent on antecedent, independent variables.
What takes place is s'een to be casually dependent on that variable.

Yet

Mead maintained a constant posture toward recognizing the tentativeness
of meaning 'Within situations.

Responses are not necessarily forthcoming,

or they can be inappropriate.

Moreover, the situational environment can

be inappropriate for a
interruption or
1971)~

g~ven

disclosu~e

interaction, or invaded by others causing

of secretly guarded information (see Blumer,

The point is that meaning is established in interaction, and

interaction occurs in situations.
situationally introduced.

A host of complexities is

therefore

But as Strauss (1969:61) notes:

A scientif~c vocabulary fashioned along the lines of "cues" or
"stimulus response" or "the unconscious" or uneeds and drives"
or merely "role-playing" and "status" and "self-conceptions"
will tend to by-pass rather than handle its intricacies.
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Deterministic'symbo1ic interactionism also miss'es :the cQmp1exiti~~
of action

a~d

As Kuhn's diagram indicates (p. 35),

meaning itself.

,

,

'behavior becomes ,unproblematic, a variable dependent on variously con
ceiv'ed deterministic forces.

But Mead was very

mu~h

opposed to this:

responses are, always uncertain--the response called for,: by the "me"
involves a moral, not mechanical, necessity.
problematic.

Action in this sense is

As Strauss (1969:57) illustrates, "I can explode quickly,

without reflection, at one

~f

my own responses.

I can dimly experience

feelings about my performance without being clear what ,exactly I am '
experiencing."

In short, therefore, behavioral meaning must be seen as

fundamentally problematic, and a

fu~l

understanding of it requires a com

prehension of the complexities and relevance of both
actions.

sit~ations

and

One can even go a step further and suggest that, in order to

comprehend fully the complexities of meaning, explanation 'of behavior
might better incorporate an "indeterminate" stance toward behavior.

The

point is, when can all the conditions and significant variables be stated
that can explain the

me~ing,

of a given interaction?

As Strauss (1969:

33) notes, "The reappraisal of past acts and the appearance of surprise
in present acts gives men indeterminate futures."
III.

THE CONCEPT OF EMERGENCE

Without ardently rejecting the entire position of deterministic
analysis, some notable symbolic interactionists have recognized its
inappropriateness and inadequacy in conceptualizing the complexity of
meaning in social interaction.

Blumer (1969:2-3) in particular has con

tinuously emphasi,zed the significance of both the "situation" and "actions"
within the situation as key elements in ,the building up of social meaning:

~T

! I}
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I,.'l.

Co~on to both of these fields [P7ychology and sog~p'logy] ~s .'. ,~~~;;J.f
the tendency to treat human beh~v~or as the p:odu~!Y\of var~o1:l~~ r >:.~r~~e.~~~
factors tpat play upon human be~ngs; concern ~s w~tl1 the behav- :.,:.rl~<~f;~~""
ior and with the factors regarded as producing 1::he~~. • .
,,:.,¥~...
[Th,us] in both such typical p~ycho1ogica1 and sociQ~ogica1
. explanations the meani~gs of such things for the hdman beings
who are acting are either bypassed or swallowed up ~n the fac
tors used to account for their behavior.
'
Bolton (1963:7) has coined the deterministic stance in sociology
as a "Behavioral Science ideology" and has noted that it conveys an
image of man as involving Ita mechanical response to or expression of
some other activating force--that is, a reaction to stimuli, to organic
tensions, to internalized norms, to social situations, to dysfunctional
changes, etc."

He sensitively notes that meaning in social acts "are

constructional in character; they are built uE rather than being simply
learned responses" (Bolton, 1963:104) (emphasis in the original). (Bolton
(1963:8) argues that an appropriate image of man in sociology and' symbolic
interactionism can be "neither than of a tbehaver' nor 'actor', but that
of 'interactor'. ).BY viewing the basic individual unit as 'interactor' a
connection is immediately made with two crucial sociological factors,
situation and transaction."
As opposed to strict deterministic models, Bolton therefore argues
that the concept of "emergence ft is more appropriate for,conceptua1izing
the building-up of meaning in terms of situations and actions. (Emergence
tfrefers ·to the process in which the combination of elements having a
given set of properties produces a new 'form having properties not
teristic of any of the elements making it up'(Bo1ton, 1971:16).

charac~

Obvious

,ly, the concept of emergence is an attempt to get at the Uintervening

proce~-;~s"

of situation and action.) Th.e deterministic .notion that t'he

meaning of behavior is located in antecedent or "before the fact" vari
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ab1es is clearly rej ect'ed.

As Bolton (1971: 2) argues,

the outcome of the episode Is not predictable just from a know
1edge--however ,comp1ete--of the personality, cultural, social
structural, or other factors existing at the outset of .the
episode, but that the outcome of the episode is also signifi
,cantly shaped by the interpersonal and intrapersonal processes
that occur during the episode.
'
However, this is not to suggest that the proponents of emergence
have given up on deterministic analysis; indeed, the very
the case.

opp~site

is

Proponents of emergence are still eager to affirm the basic

ass~ptions

of positive science in assuming that nature, including human

behavior, functions according to naturalistic logic; "given the correct
technique

o~

the part of the practitioner, the 'invariable causality o£,

the world can be made into one's bidding" (Burke, 1954:59).

As Bolton

(1971:3) explains,
, But, though these latter processes are not to be und.erstood as
mechanical manifestations of pre-existing structural and social
ization, conditions, there is no implication that they are not
explicable in naturalistic or deterministic terms--a1beit . .
this natura1istic l exp1anation must partially lie in processes
of emergence and creativity, both of which may be given ,an
acceptable scientific grounding even though bo~h may defy pre
.diction in advance.
The special "technique" recommended for the deterministic analysis
of emergent acts is tha:t of "rep1ication. 1I

First,

i~

is argued that,

with respect to any emergent act, the relevant'conditions such as social
structure, roles, situation, roles, etc. (the traditional sociological
variables), that are involved prior to the act must be noted.

Then,

after an emergent episode one must further delineate all "the cond:ttions
under which an emergence or creative act has occurred." Then it is
argued that by replication a scientific prediction can be formulated of
a similar creative event occurring under similar conditions"such as a
scientific break-through, or parallel inventions.
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Our retort, however, is that this is exactly the'2oint; after the
f\

..

fact or retrospective explanations lie at the basis of m,an's comprehen
sion of the sense ,and logic of his behavior.

Indeed, this is Mead's

point.* However, this is not to affirm that a given event or onets
behavior follows naturalistic logic, but rather that the logic is a
rationalization retroactively applied to the behavior.

The technique

of "replication" therefore merely beefs up the role of rationalization
as explanation and dresses it in scientific verbiage.

But like ration

alization, itself, it has no explanatory power, but mere~y justificatory
ability.

The notion of "replicationH is a cleverly articulated concep

tion of justification, not scientific explanation. '
Obviously this again introduces the relevance qf motives in human
behavior.

Motives are used to justify and rationalize questionable

behavior.

But they dO,not imply, nor can one infer, causal or determin-'

istic sense in behavior on the basis of its rationalization.
already been indicated why this is so.

It has

First, referring back to the

technique of, "replication" involved in the notion of emergence, when can·
all the conditions be specified?
Specification of necessary

As Burke and Louch argued, they can not.

c~nditions

involves infinite regression.

can go on

indef~nitely

and it'

As such, most theorists simply,stop at a

convenient and'arbitrary point, and

Uinte~ret

this convenience as a

cosmic reality" (Burke, 1954:231).
As noted earlier, therefore, the relevance of motive falls within
an indeterminate theory of human action.

It is only because, as Mead

*As quoted above: lilt is only after we have said the word we are
saying that we 'recognize ourselves as the person that said it ••• ; it
is only after we have done the thing that we are going to'do that we
are aware of what we are doing" (Mead, 1934:203).
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originally

arg~ed,

that actions and responses are continuously

uncert~in

and tentative, that motive-justifications become germane to behavior.
What one frequently objectifies as the sense or logic of action is an
imputation after the fact in the form of justification or rationalization.
In this same reasoning, the meaning of actions is also tentative; in
terms of the over-lapping and reciprocity of responses many
not meaningful.

~ctions

are

As Mead (1934:142) illustrated, "We realize in everyday

conduct and experience that an individual does not ,mean a great deal of
what he is doing and saying.

We frequently say that such an individual

is not himself." And thus bespeaks the significance of rationalization.

IV.

BRIEF SUMMARY

Louch argues that due to the sociologists' pre-occupation with
methodology and proper scientific form, the study of human behavior has
been led into redundancy and irrelevance.

"It has led sociologists and

psychologists to design their studies in accordance with some conception
,

of proper form and almost wholly without reference to the subject matter.
In consequence the,putative laws are often thinly disguised tautologies"
(Louch, 1969:9).

Specifically, Louch (1969:1) argues that

Behavioral scientists . . . and philosophers have put obstacles
in the way of ad hoc explanations by demanding that any explana-'
tion lean on generalities for its support. When these demands
are taken seriously • . • theories are developed which meet the
formal requisite of generality, but which pay the price for it
rather heavily. For these ,theories are often redundant and
,platitudinous or totally irrelevant to the behavior they are
designed to explain.
It is in this sense that motives have typically been construea. as
involving underlying causes or forces that constJtute the "actual" or
"intended"

m~aning

of an individual's behavior.

However,. this is

/
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obviQusly not the case.

Motives are terms of interpret~tiQn th~t

justify an individual's behavior by referring to one's, orientation with·
in a given situation.
hardly otherwise.

As such, they are situationally' 'relevant, but

But social scientists feel that "motive accounts

seem defective because 'of their rough edges, their tentativeness" (Louch,
1969:101).

But this is because actions are themselves tentative.

Louch (1969:101) concludes, "There simply are cases

i~

As

which the ascrip

tion of motives is tentative and vague, not because our tools are

inade~

quate, but because human action is often fundamentally ambiguous, often
aimless, frequently equivocal."

CHAPTER V
C. WRIGHT MILLS' SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION
C. Wright Mills was not a champion of ad hoc explanations of social
conduct either.

Priding himself in taking a "class;i.cal" stance toward

social phenomenon, or delineating ,that fine intersection between history,
social structure, and individual biography, Mills consistently attempted
theoretically to see the "Big Picture" (cf. Mills, 1959).

Thus it should

be of no surprise to find that, while his 1940 paper was the first expli
cation of a truly sociological explanation of motives, Mills also argued
tha,t motives, as lingual vocabularies, were aspects of larger social
factors such as "social groups," "societal frames," and "historical
'epochs."

He also argued that motives were not merely' justifications ·or.

descriptions of questioned behavior, but also functioned to "stabilize
and guide behavior. and expectation of the reactions of others" (Mills,
1962a:449)~

Thus he introduced a clear deterministic bias in terms of

what he called the "soc'ial function" of motives.

I.

CONSEQUENTIAL SITUATIONS AND SURROGATES FOR ACTION

Mills (1962a:440-l) correctly argues.that motives are justifica
tions in situations where conduct is questioned:

"For men live in

immediate acts of experience and their attentions are directed outside
themselves until acts are in $ome way frustrated.

It is then that aware

ness 'of self and of motive occur." Moreover, "the 'question' is a lingual
index of such conditions" (Mills, 1962a:441).

As such, motives do not
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refer ,to anything "inti persons, but" "They stand for alfticipated ;3itua
tio~a1

consequences of questioned conduct" (Mills,

1962a:441)~

As a word, a motive tends to be one which is to the actor and to
the other members of a situation an unquestioned answer to ques~
tions concerning social and 1in~ua1 conduct. A stable ,motive is
an ultimate in justificatory conversation (Mills, 1962a:443)
(emphasis in the original).
It should be remembered that by 1940, Mills' argument above repre
sented the first explicit sociological analysis of motives, and that
Mills was relying heavily on the works of Mead and Burke.

But Mills

also did more than merely sociologically integrate Burke with Mead.

He

argued that the significance of motives as merely justifications of
questioned

cond~ct

was not to deny their efficacy and function in social

behavior (see Gerth and Mills, 1953:116).

Specifically" Mills' (1962a:

441) argued that "individuals act in terms of anticipation of named con
sequences" (emphasis in the original).

And because motives are names of

consequential situations, they are also "surrogates for actions leading
to them" (Mills, 1962a:441).

Mills argues that what this involves is that,

in situations where a question is raised, motives act as an "integrative
cue" to others with regard to their cooperation or involvement in the
future completion of the situated actions.
The societally sustained motive-surrogates of situations are both
constraints and inducements . • . such words, often function as .
directives and incentives by virtue of their being the judgements
of others as anticipated by the actor (Mills, 1962a:445) (empha
sis in the original).
In this sense Mills is arguing that the social function of motives
is that they integrate action toward others by justifying the present pro
gram of action and also callout or induce 'reciprocating responses from.
others.

In this way" Mills (1962a:449) argues that

"Vocabu1a~y

of

motives ordered to different situations stabilize and guide behavior· and
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expectation of the reactions of others."
In developing a sociological explication of motiv~s, Mills there
fore takes a considerable step further than simply arguing that motives
should be conceived of, not as causes, but justifications of behavior.
First, Mills argues that the role of motives is not simply "after the
fact" of a questioned act in terms of justifying it.

But the avowed

justification or motive is centrally influential as a "before the fact"
phenomenon in terms of calling for a particular response from others,
a~d

stabilizing and guiding behaviors in the next act.

Or as Mills

(1962a:445) argues, motives function as "constraints and inducements
directives and incentives lt for others and one's self in constructing the
next act (emphasis in the original).
But there is a conceptual problem here, if not a contradiction.
Motives as "justifications" are "after the fact" with only problematic
and unspecified significance toward later interaction.

However, motives

as "surrogates of action" that callout and guide responses from others
·in building up following acts take on a deterministic or causal bias,
a~most

akin to the traditional notions of motives.

this determinism, however.

Mills was aware of

He hypothesized that "typal vocabularies of

motives for different situations are significant determinants of conduct
(Mills, 1962a:445).

He

~lso

clearly stated that "Vocabularies of motives

order to different situations stabilize and guide behavior and expecta
tions 'of the reactions of others" (Mills,' 1962a:449).

Moreover, it is

absolutely essential to Mills' (1962a:444) argument that motives act as
an' "integrative factor in future phases of the original social acti.on·or
in other acts" .Cemphasfs in the original).
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'But on what logical basis can one' argue that motives, even within
'this ,lingual-sociological sense; can be said to
conduct?

infl~e~ce'

Only one', and that is ex post facta logic,

"after the fact."

This is for obvious reasons.

pr

or

d~tel1I1i~e

rationalization

Can the

~ature

of a

response, or even a response itself, be predicted or gU;:Lranteed "before
the fact n on the basis of a motive avowed?

No;

h~an

always uncertain, tentative, and even surprising.

responses are

All one can do is

hypothesize that motives guide and stabilize conduct; their actual effect
can only be ascertained by observing a given interaction wherein motives
are avowed, and then "after the fact" argue that later events were influ-,
enced by
tion.

mo~ives

themselves.

Again, however, this logic is rationaliza

Furthermore, if one wants to hypothesize "causes" or determinants,

one has an infinite number to choose from because this effort involves .
infinite regression.
The problem actually gets down to the question--.what is the social
sign~ficance

of motives? Mills begs this question by an

~priori

or

, "before the fact" assumption that motives function to integrate others
into the social act by calling out responses in others, and thereby gU1d
ing and stabilizing conduct.

Mills here is attempting to use motives

in a vein similar to that used by others concerning "rules" and "norms."
It is explained that interaction flows smoothly because "rules" and
"norms" or "roles" (or Umotives") guide and stabilize conduct.

But the

meaning of motives can only be ascertained by noting the way others·
respond to them, and this is problematic across situations.
justifications, can be accepted, rejected, or ignored.

Motives, as

Their meaning in

action is determined by the way they are acted upon; thus ,their meaning
is an on-going problem.

Avowed motives do not guarantee particular
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respon~es·.

iort

Like other theorists, Mills is too anxious to explain behav

por instance, he e.ven argues tha.t motives are Ifunquestione~ :answers
~.

•

I

,

I

I..,

'I

!.

to questions ~9ncerning $oQi~l and lingual conduct" (Mills~ 196.fa:443)"
And in doing

~o

he hegs the

pr~blem,of

:&ec~us(e

behavioral meaniflg t

meaning of any social "factor" is de~ived in terms of tJle response
receives,

the problem in

stat~ng

r~v@;~e
v

through tautol9gy.

amounts to

th,

it

beggin~ t~~ ~yesrion

"

:.

',l.

f'4,,'"

."

Put simply, the response is not due t~ ~fi~~~~~~~~g
"'t-;: I ~'

•"

i.t ".

."

of the motive; rather, the meaning of the mQtive 'i~ given bY··~h~l".t~~R~n~p~
.. ..

I

~

..

t....

i

Mills ar~ed that motives hay:e ;.a, 4eterministic effect Q~" ~~n~r. ~ ~
actions.

Oth~f

.

theorists have

'

..

~u~~cl 'over

,"'"

this problem,

.

~''''

.n;t~bif ~'l'~n'
"

".

11

.

.

Foote ~n 1951, and he argued that the relationship between wq~~~ ~n4
action~

as outtined by Mills was somewhat

"my~terio4~!"

rq9~~. ~ll~~~fQFA
r·.
'. .
~

"

attempted to

e~plicate

phenQm~non.

I~ doing so he reempha~i~e~ Mills' determinl~m,~n~ ~t~W~

the

ta~tology ~o

the signific;mce of

its natural

lllotive~ ~s rrpet~+~ 'J:n~ ~Q.C;~"

cQPcl~sion.

~

CHAPTER VI
NELSON FOOTE ON IDENTIFICATION
As Becker (1964a:llO) argued, motivation was no problem for Mills:
, Motivation was thus no problem for Mills, and he used the famil
iar concept of role as a superordinate performance category by
means of which the individual is led on. Roles tell the indivi
dual how to act for maximum self-satisfaction and facilitation
of conduct.
Moreover, as late as 1953 Mills was still subordinating the problem of
motivation to an aspect of role theory.

For instance, as Gerth and Mills

(1953:11) argued:
Man as a person is an historical creation, and can most readily
be understood in terms of roles which he enacts and incorpo
rates. . • . His memory, his sense of time and space, his per
ception, his motives, his conception of self . . . his psycho
logical functions are shaped and steered by the specific con
figuration' of roles which he incorpo~ates from his society.
Foote also came to the problem of motivation via role theory.

The

first sentence of his paper is that "Role theory has suffered since incep
tion from lack of a satisfactory account of motivation" (Foote, 1967:343).
The deficiency of role theory, he argues~ is that, while it can explain
"standard situations" adequately, it can not explain situations that
involve role conflict, apathy, or abandonment.

riA striking revelatio'n

of the need for some theory of 'motivation . • • is disclosed by apathy
in the performance of conventional roles, when these are on the verge of
abandonment, or are accepted only under duress" (Foote, 1967:343).

Foote

(1967:353) therefore sets forth that "role theory needs to be supplemented
with an account of motivation consistent with its main premises."

He
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cite's Mills as dealing with this problem) especially with, refe,rence to
motives as justifications.

But he criticizes Mills I 'paper because it

leaves the reader with the uncomfortable feeling of an unana
lyzed hiatus between words and acts, of mystery as to just how
language does in fact motivate. It is this hiatus which the
concept of identification seems adequate to fill (Foote, 1967:
344).
By "identification" Foote (1967:347) means "appropriation of and
commitment to a
cess,

~t

identity or series of identities.

As a pro

prQceeds by naming; its products are ever-evolving self-concep

tions--with the
sig~ificant
~r

p~rticular

emph~sis

others.1t

on the con--, that is, upon ratification by

Foote argues that, in situations of role 'conflict

abandonment, one can not know what to do unless one knows who he is.
41

tlMoreover, he must know who he is with considerable conviction and clarity~
if his behavior is to exhibit definiteness and force, which is to say,
,degree of motivation" (Foote, 1967:346).
Foote (1967: 345) then defines "motivation" as referring
to the degree to which a human being, as a participant, in the
ongoing social process in which he necessarily finds himself,
defines a problematic situation as calling for performance of
a particul,ar act, with more or less anticipated consummations
and consequences, and thereby his organism releas~s the energy
app'ropriate to performing it (emphasis in the original).
However, identification underlies the' problem of motivation because,
Foote argues, within any given situation, one can not know what is
expected of him (or what the situation calls for) unless one knows onels
identity.

Says Foote (1967:350):

Only full commitment to one's identity permits a full picture
of motivation. Faith in one's conception of self is the key
which unlocks the physiological resources of the human organism,
releases the energy (or the capacity, as Dewey would say) to
perform the indicated act.
Thus identification is argued to be the basis of motivation.
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One could argue here that Foote is merely arguing in 'circles:
knowing what one is supposed to do is knowing what one is, and vice
versa.

To use one of Foote's examples

j

if one is expected to stand on

"first base" and catch the ball before the "runner" touches the base,
one knows not only what to do, but also who he is.

He is the man who

stands on first base and catches the ball before the runner touches the
base.

Furthermore, if one knows he is expected to do this for nine

"innings," then he knows that he is conunitted to this identity for nine
"innings."

The relationship between identification and motivation as

Foote sets it·up therefore seems to be quite pOintless.

Foote also says.

that both the processes of identification and motivation "release" the
energy for the given act.

But which process comes first and what their

actual differences are remains quite obscure.
However, Foote is trying to grapple with the' problem proposed'by
Miller:

how does one know what to do when situations are confusing and

actions are questioned?
of motivation.

Foote argues that this l in fact, is the problem

Now Mills argues that motives justify behavior by naming

anticipated consequences of one's action with reference to other's ac- .
tions.

These justifications can then be said to represent "surrogates

of action" that cue in or integrate others, and guide and stabilize
future actions.

Foote (1967 :'344) claims that this is still somewhat of

a mystery because Mills does not tell us "just how
.motivate." Thus the hiatus between words and acts.

langu~ge

does in 'fact·

Foote therefore

argues that, by fiat, motivation is the problem of the individual defi
ning a situation as calling for a particular act (on the basis of find
ing out who he is), "and thereby his organism releases the energy
appropriate to performing it."

Foote (1967:345) argUes along with Mills
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that motives, as surrogates of action and names for consequential situa
tions, function along with other cues n9t only to callout responses by
organizing "acts in particular situations but (also] make them recog
nizably recurrent in the life-history of any person or group."
I•

A SUPPLEMENT TO ROLE THEORY

The way in which Foote sets up the problem of motivation it is,
indeed, a supplement to role theory.9

By fiat, motivation is actually a

problem of "role-identification" or "role appropriation."

Defining a

problematic situation as calling for a particular response is the process
of identifying one's role.

Identification of who you are and what one is

supposed to do (which is the same thing!) is therefore the basis of moti
vation.

The significance of all this is that it makes, as in Mills' case,

the problem of motivation a "before the fact" phenomenon.

People are

seen to act on the basis of identifying what the situation calls for, as
indicated by various cues, such as motives, identities, etc.

Or, action

'is said to "be released" or to proceed after one has defined the meaning
of a situation as calling for a particular response.

As in Mills' case,

action is therefore seen to be a result of the meaning of definition of
the situation calling for a particular performance on the basis of various
motive-cues.

Only then is energy released.

account of action in symbolic interactionism.

This is actually a typical
As Brissett (1971:6) .

explains:
The conventional notion in most symbolic interactionism has been
that persons come to situations, define these situations, and then
(and only then) act in these situations. The "definition of the
situation" in this pOint is essentially mentalistic; i~ is an
interpretation one makes of or upon his environment. Whether this
interpretation be labeled "dynamic assessment, ,.. "definition of the
situation, II or "creation of the obj ect world, II the defi,ning ele
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ment functions the same. Men act after they have'~dentified and
conceptualized their environment (emphasis added). 1
.
In Footers case, as with most other forms of conventional symbolic
interactionism, action is seen to be the result of either the meaning
that one confers upon the situation, or the meaning of the situation as
'it calls for a particular response as indicated by various cues such as
motives, roles, etc.

With respect to Foote one wonders whether the

situation calls for a response, or one defines the situation as calling
for a response.

But in either case, action is said to tlbe released" and

contingent on a "before the factlf phenomenon; namely, the meaning of the
situation.

As in role theory, action is contingent on the meaning of

the role. 'Or in other forms of conventional symbolic

interactionism~

action is contingent on the meaning of reference groups, or the self, or
the social

~tructure--or

however meaning.is hypostatized.

In fact one can formulate the "Grand Theory of Motivation"
traditional symbolic interactionism:
of the situation (also called the

10

in

response is based on the meaning

"definition'~

of the situation) as indi

cated by vocabularies of motives, roles, identities, selves, reference
ll
groups, social structures, ad infinitum.
But unfortunately, at the
basis of this "Grand Theory of Motivation" is its own Achilles Heel-
"The Grand Sociological Tautology.1t The creation of the sociological
tautology goes as follows.
given meaning.

A given situation is observed to involve a

This meaning is then hypostatically interpreted as a kind

of existent object, say, a role, definition, or value, etc. (a number of
arbitrary metaphors are used).

Then this "object lt is used to explain the

resultant actions of the individuals within the situation.

But because

the argument is circular or merely redescriptive, it has no explanatory
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value.

Specifically, action is not the result of the meaning or defini

tion of the situation, but the situation derives its meaning from the
response to it.

And this is why philosophic

9) bluntly say, and with good reason:

logicians.~ike

Louch (1969:

tlTriviality, redundancy, and

tautology are the epithets which I think can be properly applied to the
behavioral scientist."
II.

THE HIA'I1JS

The meaning of a vocabulary of motive, situation, role, self,
reference group, and all other sociological variables, is created and
established by the response to it.

Even the significant symbol, as Mead

(1934:84) consistently argued, is always dependent on "the context in

terms of which, or as the field within which, significant gestures or
symbols do in fact have significance." And meaning is determined by
response.

Thus by its very nature, meaning is an "after the fact" prob

lem within an indeterminate field of action responses.

Meaning involves,

as Mead said, a moral necessity, but no mechanical necessity.
Thus the hiatus between words and actions inevitably remains because
the meaning of response is an "after the fact" problem that is always
tentative.

Response creates the meaning of

creates the meaning of "Me."

language~

just as the "I"

But response is uncertain and

proble~atic.

Unfortunately because symbolic interactionists have been. so anxious to
explain away the response, we have little idea of how problematic it is.
But even within the daily events of everyone1s life there is

cons~ant

discrepancy between what one expects from others and one's. self, and what
actually happens.

And the significance of motives, as justifications,. is

that they rationalize this discrepancy of action, but they dp not deter
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ministica11y explain it.

The significance of motives, as Lyman and

Scott (1970:112) argue <is "its ability

~o

throw bridges between the

promised and the performed; its ability to repair the broken and restore

the estranged."

CHAPTER VII
ERNEST BECKER'S CRITIQUE OF MILLS
No theorist has conceptually focused on the hiatus between words
and actions as vividly as Ernest Becker.

In his analrsis of Mills'

social psychology, it is failure on the'part of Mills to deal with this
hiatus that amounts 'to Becker's most emphatic criticism.

As Becker'

(1964a: 118) explains:
And in order to understand this
one historical current that was
,psychology. This permits us to
ogy from still another point of

phenomenon we have to pick up
not elaborated in Mills' social
evaluate Mills r social psychol
view: that of phenomenology~

The main emphasis of phenomenology in social 'psychology is that
meaning must b~ seen as an on-going accomplishment predicated on the
behavior or action of

t~e

organism toward, its object-world.

The emphasis

is on the ability of the organism to act toward objects and therein cre
ate a relationship with the object.

Now this must'be emphasized since

action toward obJects is not an automatic given built in to the human
organism.

Rather, the organism, through trial and error experimentation,

develops the ability to act.

In the human's case, the problem is even

more complex since it is only humans that develop a reactive capacity
toward symbolic objects (see Becker, 1962a). ' But phenomenologists
ardently stress the independence between objects (including symbols) and
actions.
Becker notes that other theorists have depicted this hiatus as a
mind-body dualism, or more appropriately stated, a dualism between sym
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bolic thoughts versus action.

There is a separation that is only

ove~~

come, and then only partially, by the experience of the individual in
acting.

Says Becker (1964a:120):

Now, this' self-body dualism, as we would expect, is not uniform
in everyone. That is to say, some of us pay more attention to
the external world, act in it more, test ourselves with the out
side of our bodies. Others among us act less in the external
world, shrink up more within themselves, feed ourselves on
thought or fantasy, take refuge from the demands of the outside,
expand our inner life, and nourish ourselves on it.
The important point, however, is that "words mean little to the develop
ment of our total personality unless we connect them up with some kind
of lived experience"

(Bec~er,

1964a:12l).

Becker concludes that if Mills would have incorporated this
phenomenological point of view in his social psychology, he would have
realized that situated actions, far from being guided and controlled by .
vocabularies of motive, are frequently made progressively more tentative
and unpredictable, especially in complex urban environments.

The prob

lem for the individual is precisely in being able to control and initiate
a response within problematic

s~tuations

(see Becker, 1964a:122).

In

this sense, Becker (1964b:23-4) is arguing that "meaning is won by behav
. ior, not merely by registering experience." Thus for meaning to be
established on any level or situation, "the organism must be able to call
up a response to it" (Becker, 1964b:19).
automatic; rather it is problematic.

But human reactivity is not

Mills and Foote failed to emphasize

this in their social psychology because response was largely begged and
explained away.

Moreover, theorists in general have been so used to

explaining away the complexities of bodily responses' as being remotely
controlled or directed by roles, norms , motives',

sym~ols,

and other

social "forces" that the problematics of action have been largely
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ignored.*

But as Becker (1964b:15) argues,

are primary.

Symbols (and

othe~

social

"Behavip~J'energy-conversion

fac~Qrsl ~re

gadflies that edge

the organism on, but it is the organism that edges. 't Moreover, it is
the organism that, if capable, uses the social ·"object. 1t
a~

For instance,

Becker (1964b:lS) argues:
symbols enter in only to facilitate and enrich the process.
[but] it is the organism that uses the symbol, that must tend
. away from or toward the object signaled. The organism tends,
moves, recoils; the symbol is merely a counter.
I.

THE HIATUS, PAR EXCELLENCE

But some individuals are more gifted in acting than others.

In

-the construction of meaningful actions some individuals are more capable
o~

using symbols, motives, norms, and roles.

But no one is "used by".

symbols, motives, norms, etc.; no one is "taken by the role of the otl1er."
Meaning is contingent on the individual's ability to act, but there is no
guarantee how effective in any situation the individual is going to be.
There is a hiatus between what words or situations call.for, and recipro
eating action.

As Becker (1962b:496) illustrates, "The simple act of

engaging someone by offering him a seat is fraught with possibilities
of bungling."

And this "bungling" is a matter of .no small significance.

The hiatus, 'par excellence, between words and actiohs is schizo

phrenia.

The problom of schizophrenia, as Becker (1964b:52)

nrgue~

is

that "words are not fused to organismic meanings." The problem, above
all, is ineptitude in acting, in
objects.

initiat~ng

a response toward symbolic

While this is a very complex problem the- general features of

*Dennis Wrong's (1970:38) advice might be germane here: "I think
we must start with the recognition that in the beginning there is the
body."
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schiz'ophrenia is that
spl~t

"the~e

seems to exist a real possibility of a

between mere apprehension and

t~~e

meanin~~~ (Bec~~;,

experience of

,

1L

.

I~ is in this sense that the schizophrenic maYQ~:i~are

1964b:52).

\'.

symbotl.ic obj ec~s I "but no corresponding firm and broad range

Qf

'

~ntor"

Qf
. I

personal behaviors" (Becker,

1964b:~~2).

Thus the

characterized frequently as possessing a complex

is

schizophre~i~

~n4 eve~ f~~+:~~~ing
~

::

"

.'

"

"voeabulary" ap to his experience, but an inepti;u<.i, in belt~Y~~~~t+Y
transacting with others or the object-worlq.
purthermpre, theorists do

no~ ~now

o~ly

the vaguest, most

;nt.o the organ;ism." We

~o

gen~ral

know

th~s

time

notions on how

~h~t~

"w,p

exper~en~e ~$ p'q4l~

tnUI

tgy~

with children, mfl,terllf+l
'"

~ ~Qrr~sponding

t

I

"feeling" of high $ellSe of worth is

In

~ow cq~B~~~P~P

As Becker (1964b: 2Q) pay& I

acting becomes engendered in people.
have

at

~e~1it~+

.

~

fQr
.

fhi+~ to begin behaviorally to wanipulate his objec~~~q~fd.
•

t'...

t~~

;hp

~~t

..

'.

'1"

'"

+ons, Q~qavioral trans~tion fro~ cq114hood to adulth~Q~ i~ cqm~i~~ ~n~,

yet,

~qu~lly i~po+tant

in terms pi tne development of

.

,

"

~ ~pm~~;'en; h~~nt
,

'

f

In t~rms Qf schi~Qphrenia, the hiatus between word~ lnd ~~~~Q~~
~I~:

has be~n depicted by {..~i~g as a person being "embodied,"
The em90died person, says

~aing

Qr

~~

!~\t~:JllR~4~p~.!~
t,

(1$60:67-70),

~

.

f;

has a sense of being flesh and blood and QP~Cs, of being bi~logi
cally alive and real; he knows himse+f to be $ub,:S.tantial. Tq.
the extent that he is thoroughly "in" hi~ b!=l4y, ,he is likely lq .
have a sense of personal continuity in time..
.:'
",
The scllizophrenic, on the' other hand, does not

expetien~e '. his

body as

~ll$l

",;;;'t'\_u

center of his own causality.
disjointed.

His responses to situations' are confused" ,

Laing therefore characterizes this hiatus between words an4

actions as the individual being "unembodied." As Becker (1964b:Sl)
further explains:
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This may be a clue to one aspect of the puzzling phenomenon of"
"schizophrenic language." When words no longer refer to poten-.
tial organismic action, or to any felt organismic involvement,
they lose their quality as true language. Dewey'S observation
is apt: he calls this split between word sound and organismic
quality a Itshortcircuiting."
I I.
As Mead

THE HIATUS AS EVERYONE'S PROBLEM

(1~34:147)

said, "There is, of course, a great deal in

one's conversation with others that does not arouse in one's self the
same response it arouses in others." Moreover, as Mead also indicated,
there is a great deal in conversation with one's self that does not
receive a response that was anticipated.

Responses are always uncertain.

There is a hiatus, then, that is an integral feature of human behavior
itself.

It .lies between one's self and one's actions, or between what

we expect ourselves to do, and what in fact we actually do.

Thus in each

social situation this discrepancy is always a latent possibility,

Each

situation can involve the potentiality of discrediting the prized image
of the self.

Thus Becker (1964b:69) argues,

If one act can undermine a self, and one social role fragment it,
then it can have no duration except in fantasy. But let me
stress that this applies not to the schizophrenic only_ This is
the anxiety of every social actor. "I am nothing if each situa
:tion can construc~ me anew."
Managing situational inconsistency and confusion, then, is an absolute
necessity in maintaining tlself" in social interaction.

"Questions" arise

in conduct frequently because individuals say or think one thing and yet
do another.

ttNature, on the other hand, seems blissfully unconcerned with

anything except keeping action moving forward, proceeding from one·situa
tion to the next ll (Becker, ,1964b:70).

T~e

sense of continuity and perma

nence of one's self therefore becomes largely a product of one's ability
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to rationalize th.e discrepancy. into an acceptable acc::ord ~Q other!l.
as Becker (1964b: 70) 'says) "rhus every

~ndividual

the cause-and-effect myth of his own past."

O+';

is pbliged to 'creatQ

And this) of coufse,

i~tr~

duces the significance of motive-rationalizations of the discrepancies
in social interaction.

Motives'function to justify "questioned" behav

ior to significant others.

They function to bridge the hiatus between

what words or situations call for and what actually occurs.

CHAPTER VIII
MOTIVES AS DRAMATURGICAL PROBLEMS
A motive, as we have seen, is a justificatory

r~ason

in interac

tional contexts where behavior is being judged by significant others.
It refers to a directed disposition toward a goal relative to one's
orientation in a situation that explains the reason for the action.

As

such, motives introduce the problem of "drama" into human conduct, or
'the attempt by individuals to dramatize, through justification, their
purposes and intentions.

The critical variable of these dramatic

appeals is, of course, the social audience from where questions toward
one's behavior are first initiated.

As Burke (1954:274) said:

Human conduct, being in the realm of action and end (as con
trasted with the physicist's realm of motion and position) is
most directly discussable in dramatistic terms. By "drama
tistic" terms are meant those that begin in theories of action
rather than in theories of knowledge (emphasis in the original).
Action is therefore the key variable underlying the construction
of social meaning; meaning is

n~t

understood as a symbolic construct, a

body of knowledge, or definitions that determine, in some sense, the
significance of actions.

As a theory of action, then, motives refer to

dramatic appeals to significant others for justification of one's actions.
Motives are therefore types of actions themselves.

In this sense,

motives, as dramaturgical actions, can be categorized into two types:
discursive and apparent.

"Discursive motives are those which are trans

mitted verbally, and apparent motives are those which are communicated
by the appearat;lce of the part1es involved" (Edgley, 1971a:10).

Oh~iously,
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one can justify one's conduct frequently through appearance only by, as
in the case of a policeman, simply showing a badge or a seafc4 warrant.,
Even "appearing" within particular settings or situations can convey
one's motives (see Stone, 1970 and Lyman and Scott, 1967).

The mere

presentation of self can convey motives, but yet, if further questioning
is involved, one can resort to verbal justifications.

The point is that

one can not only give motives, but also give off motives (see Goffman,
1959).
,This is not to suggest, however, that dramatistic appeals auto
matically work.

Unsympathetic audiences, as Goffman (1959:51) critically

notes, have a frequent "tendency to pounce on trifling flaws as a sign
than the whole show is false • •
mo~ives

tt

The significance or meaning of

is also contingent on the problematic responses of'others.

Untoward or questionable behavior can be "normalized" through motive
avowal, or the motive can be rejected and the audience thereby react
toward the individual in unanticipated ways.12

Yarrow and Schwartz, et

al. (1955) have even studied the phenomenon of untoward behavior becoming
normalized, not through motive-avowal, but through blunt denial on, the
part of the audience that anything unusual is happening.

Audiences' can

clearly be either sympathetic, apathetic, or without mercy.

Following

this same logic, the question of whether a motive is "real" or not can
therefore be determined on the basis of whether the motive is accepted
or tolerated by the audience (Edgley, 1971b).

"Unreal" motives are
simply those that the audience will not accept. 13
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I.

STIGMA AS EVERYONE'S PROBLEM

Understanding' that the response of the audience is the
variable that determines whether a motive is accepted

contingen~

a~ "rea~"

or not

introduces the whole realization that being discredited and stigmatized
- is everyone's problem in all situations.

As Howard Becker (1963:9)

argu,es, meaning' is not inherent in any particular ,behavior such as, say,
a deviant act, but is "rather a consequence of the application by others
of rules and sanctions to an 'offender'." The meaning of a given per
~on 's

-behavior, even if justified by an avowed motive, is' determin'ed' by

the consequence of the response of others.

Thus, ,in all situations

there is the latent possibility that inadvertent acts and discrepancies
made by the individual can be used by an audience to discredit him.
And, as Goffman (1959:51) describes, "even sympathetic audiences can be
momentarily disturbed, shocked, and weakened in their faith by the dis
covery of a picayune discrepancy in the impressions presented to them."
Moreover, as Goffman (1963:127) further indicates:
The most fortunate of normals is likely to have his half-hidden
failing, and for every little failing there is a social occa
sion when it will 100m large, creating a shameful gap between
virtual and actual social identity. Therefore the occasionally
precarious and the constantly precarious form a single continu
um, their situation in life analyzable by the same framework.
Stigma, therefore, should be understood as a general feature of all
societal situations.

ItThe normal and the stigmatized,are not persons but

rather perspectives.

These are generated in social situations during

mixed contacts by virtue of the unrealized norms that are likely to play
upon the en~ounter" (Goffman, 1963:138).14
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II.

MOTIVES AS PROBLEMS INVOLVING CONSEQUENCES

Motives do not involve" nor do
nants" of actions.

th~y

infer "causes" or "determi

Rather" their social significance involves conse

quences, or how particular acts, including motive-avowals, are responded
to by others.

This underlies the problem of "meaning" in general. Mean

ing is on-goingly a problem of the future.

Thus in terms of the meaning

of motive-justifications, it is not, as Brissett (1971:12) argues, "as
much a matter of something believed to be true being true in its conse
quences (a traditional notion in symbolic interactionism); rather, that
something believed to be true is true only in its consequences" (empha
sis in the original).
Within the

~ramaturgical

theory of action (as motives have been

shown to be a part), "cause" is a moot and silent problem.

If the prob

lem of "cause" is addressed at all, theorists simply say that any given
action involves an endless variety of social, cultural, psychological, .
and physiological variables (see Lemert, 1967).

As such, if one

~ants

causally to explain action, theories of imitation, conditioned-response,
instincts, or drives" etc.--all of these theories may have relevance,
but they only amount to relatively arbitrary and partial explanations
at best.
It can be

sa~d,

therefore, that the significance of

motive~

justifications falls within an indeterminate theory of action.

The empha
lS
sis is on the problematics of action, its vOlatability and change.
Thus" as Strauss (1959:43) argues, Itit is not

~hange

that needs to be

explained but its specific directions; and it is not lack of change that
needs to be taken into account, but change itself."

In this respect the
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concept of "emergence" is germane (se~'p. 42).

Bl.l.t the ability, "after

the fact" on the basis of replication, ~o natU'ralistic~llr or determini~tically explain the episode is
cpnditions~-physiologica1,

1ar~e1r

First,'all of the

psychological, sociological, cultura1--can

never be completely specified.

Moreover,

lem of redescriptive rationalization.
tautological.

+ejected.

r~plication

is

~imp1y

a prob

Thus its explanation is merely

Lastly, replication as rationalization simply returns us /'

to the problem at hand, the function in human action of rationalization
in general.

But the significance of rationalization is not a problem of

involving the "real" explanation; the significance is whether it is
accepted by others.

Its critical importance is therefore centered around

the problem of consequences.

Or, how does a given social audience

respond to an avowed motive or explanation, and for what reasons does a
given audience accept one rationalization over another?

As was discussed

earlier, individuals can utilize and avow an innumerable number of re1a
tively arbitrary motive-rationalizations or explanations to justify
behavior in varying social contexts.

Furthermore, the substance of an

avowed rationalization or explanation is not, in and of itself, the
important consideration, but the impact and influence the rationalization
will have on the given audience.

In this respect an individual can

attempt to provide a rationalization for behavior that best satisfies the
needs, interests, and assumptions of the social audience, and thereby
maximize the probability of his success in·negotiating the outcome of the
social interaction.
alization with the

The key is the ability to match up an avowed ration
expec~ations

of the audience.

Or, as Lyman and Scott

(1970:125) have offered:
In interacting with others, the socialized person learns a reper
toire of background expe~tancies that are appropriate for a
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variety of others. Hence the "normal" individual will change his
account Ior rationalization] for different role others • • • •
Both the account offered by ego and the honoring or non-honoring
of the account on the part of al~er will ultimately depend on
the background expectancies of the interactants. By background
expectancies we refer to those sets of taken-for-granted ideas
that permit the interactants to interpret remarks as accounts
in the first place (emphasis in the original). - 
Actually, the term "background expectancies" is a "catch-all" term
for a complex assortment of different kinds of criteria that audiences
ut~lize

tion.

to judge

th~

worth of a motive-avowal, depending on the situa

For instance, a patient in psychoanalysis will typically

expl~in

-or rationalize his behavior in'a particular vocabulary-involving, certain
assumptions
lyst.

~hat

are common to him, yet unacceptable to the psychoana

This does not mean, however, that the patient's account is

erroneous, for indeed in another circumstance it may be quite acceptable.
But in this particular circumstance it is not unusual for a therapist' to
insist that the patient redress his account in a

vocabu~ary

and set of

assumptions that compliments the authoritarian status and ideology of
the professional.

In fact, some argue that therapy can not progress in

psychoanalysis until the patient reformulates his account into the
vocabulary of the doctor (cf. Burke, 1954).

In a particular situation,

then, the significant background expectancies may involve only ideologi
calor philosophic assumptions.

In other situations they may involve

considerably more.
Whether an account is honored or not may rest not on the criteria
of philosophic assumptions, but more basic factors such as the political,
social, and economic interests of the audience.

For instance, many a

conscientious objector has endured either long jail sentences or perma
nent exile not because their motives were necessarily insincere, but
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because the State interpreted their noncompliance as

~ithe+

due to

"other" motive-s or that their behaviQr represented a flt~eat to tl1q .
State's privilege and authority to tnduct men into

mit~ta+y se~viqe,

Another highly different example is the phenomenon of "symbolic

crq."

sades" where a larger party, due to a perceived threat to its status
and prestige (as well as economic and political interests) sponsors the
idea that another less powerful group harbors evil or dangerous motives
against them and should therefore be treated either punitively or as an
enemy (Gusfield, 1963).

These examples, and of course many others,

stand to illustrate that in the negotiation of motive-rationalizations,
the interaction should not only be understood as a "drama" of one party
appealing or accusing another party, but indeed, a political drama where
the legitimacy of one individual's plea is judged by other's in terms of
the latter's own interests of status, power, and ip,eology.

These are

some of the important factors that are involved in the broad notion of
"background expectancies."

III.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF MOTIVATION

The analysis of motivation, as found implicitly in ,Mead and expli
citly in Burke, is only amenable to a sociological theory in so far as
that theory maintains a consistent stance toward the nature of social
'meaning.

Specifically, meaning can not be reified into impersonal objects

that in some way determine the flow of behavior.

Rather, meaning must.be

seen as on-goingly established by behavior and reciprocating responses.
The significance of motives becomes relevant at this point because they
function to justify behavior that is frequently meaningless and ambiguous.
Indeed, it seems hard to imagine the relevance of motives at all if social
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meaning was constant and
logical

~etaphors.

all-perva~ive

as depicted in traditional socio

(Possibly this is why most traditional symbolic

interactionists have

ha~

little to say about motives.)

In this sense, a sociological understanding of motives amounts to
only one aspect of a larger theory of social action, namely dramaturgy.
The entire emphasis of

drama~urgy

is to describe the intracacies and.

processes through which meaning becomes established.
~neories
th~t

Thus it repels

of human behavior that explain action in terms of metaphors .

largely exclude the significance of human behavior itself.

Drama

turgists share Blumer's (1969:66) understanding "that human interaction
is a positive shaping process in its own right.
have to build up their respective lines of

co~duct

tation of eac4 other's ongoing lines of action."
germa~~

becomes
n~eds

some
In

The participants in it
by constant
The

proble~

interpf~

of

here because meaning is problematic and actign

fo~m

mOltv~a

f~equent+r

of justification.

general~

the significance of a sociological theory of

motiva~ion

belongs to a l~rger theory of action that resists int~rrreting benaviof
on the basis of anything other than behavior itself.

relevance of ~dtives lies in observing and describing tre
people

interpr~t

,

way in which

their own behavior, and thus keep actipn IDQvlna.

analytic emphasis is to understand how people

tho

Sreci~tcallYI

themselve~

Th~

on-goingly

establish and justify their reality; not in substituting through metaphor
the meaning of action into another justificatory explanation or rationali
zation.

This is simply to say that a soc,iology of motivation is not

relevant to any "perspectives by incongruity." We need to understand how
people interpret their own behavior, not how remote theorists can inter
pret it through an infinite number of metaphors '.

.
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A sociology of motivation as outlined herein involves an apprecia
tion of man as an artisan of his own art, an actor. of his own dramas.
Motives are

dram~tic

appeals to audiences, and their

signific~nce

involves consequences of other's actions toward self.

Theoretically,

what is needed therefore is a cogent description of human doings,

a

description of the forms and styles of actual human interaction.

But

the endless redescription' of human actions on the basis of metaphor or
tautology simply makes it less "real" and insightful.

A description

of human interaction considered dramatistically involves very much the
same technique as that of the art critic in general:
The aim of all commentary on art now should be to make works of
art--and, by analogy, our own experience--more, rather than less,
real to us. The function of criticism should be to show how it
is what it is, even that it is what it is, rather than to show
what it means (Sontag, 1961:23) (emphasis in the original).
Men

int~rpret

their own actions, and build their own situations

accordingly. ·A truly servicable science would therefore attempt to put
men back in the role of being critics unto themselves.

By doing so, a

science would emphasize how man on-goingly constructs his world, and
thus not how he is constructed by it.

The task is to assist man in

hearing, seeing, and feeling more of the consequences of his own actions.
Or, as Sontag (1961:23) argues, "What is important now is to recover our
senses.

We must learn to

~more,

(emphasis in the original).

to hear more, and to feel more"

CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
The image of man conveyed by Mead's social behaviorism is that he
is an active creature by nature.

As Desmonde (1970:57) argues:

Mead also rejected the notion that [human] organisms passively
respond to stimuli. He contended that the organism dynamically
selected its stimuli; it does not react to perception. The
organism to a great extent determines its environment., '•••
Mead thus [regarded] the organism as a dynamic, forceful agent
molding the world around it, rather than existing as a mute
receptacle for stimuli which are later associated.
In this same respect it has been argued that action is not the
result of roles, norms, selves, or motives.

Rather, men use ,roles,

norms, and motives as aids in building up our own actions.

Motives in

particular are rationalizations the men use to justify the discrepancies
in situated actions.
This understanding lends crucial insight even into the nature of
larger organizations and structures.

Men use organizations and develop

a complex "under-life" to the structure itself, as Goffman (1961) has
described so well.

Similarly, even "lower participants" in complex

. organization creatively develop positions or power and status that
incredibly

determi~es

(see Mechanic, 1968).

the structure and functioning of the

~rga~izatio~

Moreover, modern organization and system

theoris~s

are becoming cognizant of the need for a more viable social psychology.
As Buckley (1967:145) argues, as a more

dynami~

social psychology is

embraced, "organizational behav'ior takes 011 a'processual character of
creation and recreation of meanings and expectations

i~

a succession of
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situations that are only partially or not at all regularized and stand
ard~zed.n

Buc~ley

moder~

(1967:105) therefqre argues that

system theo

rists
r~pres~nt

an attempt at a rather complete overhaul of cont~mpo
rary consensus theory by a return to social psychologi9al pasics
and a reb~~lding, from the grou~d up, of'a balanced and dYn~~ic ,
conceptio~ of complex social organization.
'

Put simply, a viable system model mUit contain a Vi~~~, ~~,t~t ~~~~n~t~
11.

ogy, and each cj imens ion of the model must be cRf,gruent "with": ~D~

as well as ulttmately being externally
':1'.",:

The

illu~trious

metaphors of

•

vali~~.

~

••

~ ~ ','-i :'. "
<

.:.

J

sociology an4
"

'. t

~I;

'"

, ~

..
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','

\.

t~adit~op'a~

,

",,,~!:ij~f I

, . : ..

~P9~~t

~.

./' :.

T

~

•

rsychology--so~ial structures, orgapi~~tions, ~~atus~~, role~i ~q;m-~.
..

,

se~ves~-these metaphors have impuded p~ witq a co~cep'~io~ ~f ~~c~~l tn~~'~
act~op

as bein~ inhereptly orde;e~ ~n4 sensible. '~ut the

~P' +~

mqre

1

able tQ break l~rough these concept¥al illusions, the mor~ one f~ ~PtF ,~
a~~ gre~t disc~epancy ~nd confusion, npt only i~ action, but in soC~tt
.
.
'"\

Qrianization.

is

~pe+@fore

tion

aff~,::rm~n'

The "sQcial order" tllat we have been so used to
mQre

pro~ressively s~~p

an~ justif~~~torr

powers.

is a product of

~~

own

ration~t+l.ijY

iiowev~T,

there is a dlscrepancy
betweon
.
.
..
But ?ntil one pegins accur~~ely to de~~r~~p ,
~

O,ur

wpr~~

actio~J

and

one

society,

Q~r

wil~

actiQn$..
neve.r

knQw

th~

present $tate of order

....

o~ d~~~tder ~~

It ha~ been ~rgue4 that conceptualizi~g human action ~~~ ~~tiy~~

•

.

i

tion as dram~tu;~ic~+ problems affords th~ ba~~s of this kind of Ql~fi~~+
. . "'\.*~

pe~cription,

NOTES
1.

Herbert Blumer (1969) was the first to label Mead's social behavior
ism as "symbolic interactionism."

2.

Psychologists have so thoroughly confused the notions of cause and
motive that possible distinction between the two is probably not even
within the realm of possibilities in that discipline: see, for
example, R. W. White (1959) and a recent book considered a landmark
in psychology by Cofer and Appley (1964).

3.

It should be emphasized at this point that the terms "action," "mean
ingful action," and "behavior" are at times used interchangeably.
However, all of these terms are meant to imply or refer to the con
struction of meaning in interactional terms; i.e., the problem of
individual actors fitting together and building up their lines of
action co-jointly. Moreover, this qualification extends to include
those references to the analysis of the actions of an individual
actor; i.e., the dialogue between the "I" and the "Me" must be under
stood as a problem of interaction. A further explication of these
assertions is given in Chapter One, sub-section "Action."

4~

It should be parenthetically acknowledged that the interpretation in
this essay of Mead's analysis of meaning is only one of several vary
ing interpretations. The variance is largely due, I would argue, to
an inherent circularity in Mead's analysis in that, depending on
where the emphasis lies, meaning can be interpreted as either a
shared, symbolic phenomenon between groups of individuals, or an
interactional phenomenon that i~ on-goingly created and built up in
behavior.
For instance, ~wo extreme kinds of interpretations will be demon
strated. "If meaning is established only when the response elicited
by the symbol is the same for the one that elicits the symbols as
well as for the one who acknowledges it, then the interpretation
logically leans toward an understanding of meaning as being a sym
bolically shared, cognitive phenomenon between people. In this
respect theorists then envision the human organism as becoming "
"funded" with socially shared meanings through such processes as "
socialization, education, inculcation of culture, and acquisition of
language. )t also lends an. analysis ·to the problem of "universality , "
which Mead (1934:99) explained as
gestures or symbols that have the same or common meanings for
all members of the group, whether they make them or address
them to other individuals, or whether they overtly respond to
them as made or addressed to them by other individuals.
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On the other hand, if meaning is established only When the response
elicited by the symbol is the same for the one that elicits the
symbol as well as for the one who acknowledges it# then tpe interpre~
tation of meaning shifts from a symbolic; cogni~ive phe~qmenon to a
behavioral, interactional phenomenon that is on-goingly sustained by
the nat~re of responses toward objects and other individuals. Far,
from becoming "universal, H meaning becomes interpreted as a situa- .
tional creation that is fundamentally problematic and achieved only
on the basis of on-going interaction. Also, this interpretation is
not to be understood as 'excluding or negating the possible role of
consciousness and awareness with respect to the nature of meaning.
Rather~ instead of assuming, as does the former interpretation; that.
interaction is continuously governed by rational and cognitive pro
cesses "in" the respective actors, the thrust of the second interpre
tation.is that men can become conscious and are capable of rational
izing their actions. In this sense it is assumed that, "Only
when
. activity is interrupted does man become conscious of him
self and then in a rationalizing manner" (Brissett, 1971:12).
As the section on Mead already indicates, this essay emphasizes the
latter interpretation of the nature of meaning although it does
acknowledge that other interpretations offer theoretical utility,
depending on the theorist's purposes. However, it is argued ,above
that, with respect to the problem of motivation, the former interpr~
tation typically involves assumptions about human behavior that are
grossly over-socialized and mechanistic. It is around these issues,
in fact, that a critique of the former interpretation of meaning is
formulated. A reccnceptualization of the problem of motivation is
then offered based on the interpretation that meaning is an o~-going
creation of the activities of social interactants.
5..

There is a very interesting contradiction here. Kuhn (1,967:47) first
notes that the oral tradition emphasized a "strain" to 'get it right',
that is, to be correct." Yet later he argues that one can interpret
Mead loo,sely because of the "elusive" nature of the oral tradition.
Kuhn (1967:48) argues that numerous sub-theories stem from the
essential ambiguities of Mead's position,
ambiguities and contradictions which were generally interpreted
to be dark, inscrutable complexities too difficult to under
stand as long as the orientation remained largely in the oral
tradition.

6,.

By "indeterminance," Kuhn (1967) is referring to theories that avoid
explanations of human action in terms of antecedent and consequent
variables. I~determinate theories are fundamentally.descriptive in'
nature. They analyze the way in which interactants attempt to fit
their respective lines of action together, an~ thereby build up and
sustain meaning in situations. The theorist thus avoids the tendency
to imagine, in some way, specific variables that determine meaning in
situations. All references to indeterminate theories in this essay
will follow Kuhn's distinctions.
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7.

See especially Mills' (1962b:426-3l) formufation of Meaq's Symbolic
interactionism that represents a highly deterministic model of role
theory especially designed for a sociplogy of knowle~ge.

8. . It ~an be further argued that this use of tautological e~planation by
traditional symboli~ interactionists, as well as sociologists in gen
eral, is the underlying source of sociological "reification." Berger
and Luckman (1966:89) explain:
Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they
were things, that is,. non-human or possibly supra-human terms.
Another way of saying this is that reification is the appre~ .
hension of the products of human activity as if they were some
. thing ~lse than human products . • • (emphasis in the origina~).
Dramaturgists clearly see that the meaning of man's social world is on
goingly constructed on the basis of his actions. toward social objects.
But most symbolic interactionism and sociology explain behavior as a
result of the me.aning of these social obj,ects. Thus "definitions of
the situa·tion, It "roles, II "norms, II "reference groups, tt etc., become
reified social objects that are used to explain resultant behaviors.
Reification is therefore a product of tautOlogy: on-going behavior,
which is used as evidence of something like norms,roles, becomes con
ceptualized into an object which is then used to explain the original
behavior. This has indeed been the traditional, theoretical fate of
motives. As products of tautology, motives were seen to be not only
indicated by behavior, but were also used causally to explain it.
Thus, in considering the significance of motives, norms, and roles,
if the theorist fails to stay close to Mead's understanding that mean
ing is an on-going product of behavioral response, his explanation is
doomed to mysticism on the basis of tautology and reification.
9.

Stone (1970:396) also sees the significance of Foote's paper as a sup
plement to role theory by providing an explanation of how one deter
mines one's roles.

10.

A similar "Grand 'Theory of Motivation" in sociology is advocated by
Zetterberg (~957).

11.

Meltzer's short analysis of the problem of motivation in Mead commits
the same tautology as Foote. Meltzer (1967:18) says,
In my judgement, a conception of motivation can be formulated
that is both useful and consistent with Mead's theories.
Motivation c'an refer to "a process of defining (symbolically,
of course) the goal of an act". •
I mean to designate
"motive," however, the definition the individual makes, at
any given time, of the objectives of his own specif~c acts.
Here, again, the definition of an act is hypostatized into something
different from the response itself. The act is based on the meaning
or definition that precedes the response. Yet) this is a tautology
because the meaning of a prior situation is given by the response to
it. The meaning one imputes toward objects is not prior to the
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response, but is given in the response. Making the
thing different is redescription and redundancy.
12.

13.

m~aning i~to

For a discussion of the intricacies of normalizatio~
Davis (1967) and Roman' and Trice (1971).

some

see

prQc~s~es

.

This behavioral determination of whether a motive is "real" or lIu~realn
'has obvious advantage over Gerth and Mills' somewhat mystical approach.
They suggest that:
We may ,assume that the more deeply internalized in the person,
and'the more clearly integrated with the psychic structure, a
vocabulary of motive is, the greater is the chance that it con
tains "the real motives." In fact, that is what ureal motives"
may be assumed to mean. We must, in order to "test" motives,
therefore, attempt to find out on what level of character struc
ture a given vocabulary is integrated (Gerth and Mills, 1953:
120).
How such a test may be, carried out is never explained by Gerth and
Mills. As indicated in the chapter on Mills, however, this somewhat
mystical explanation of "real" motives is due to their misconception
of meaning. Behavior does not result from the meaning of motives,
the latter being conceptualized hypostatically as some kind of mental
istic phenomenon, such as an "attitude," or "thought," or as a' "norm,"
or, "sttuation." The meaning of a motive is behaviorally derived, or'
given by the response to it. It is only on the basis of this same
logic that a determination of whether a motive is "real" or not can be
made; i.e., on the response of the audience of either accepting the
motive or rejecting it.

14.

This situational understanding of stigma or deviance should therefore
largely repudiate the tendencies of some theorists to make deviance a
problem relative to only the codified laws of society (see Gibbons
and Jones, 1971). Clearly, deviance involves the discrepancies in
any situated act~on where self and others are judged.

15.

It has also been argued that the indeterminant theory of action involved
in a dramaturgical understanding of motives is "mystical" because it is
said to imply notions of free will (see Bolton, 1971). This ~harge
comes about largely by misconstruing the philosophy that underlies the
dramaturgical theory of action and the sociology of dramaturgy. While
Lyman and Scott (1970) correctly explain that dramaturgy has philosophic
roots in modern existentialism that involves an emphasis on "freedom,u
this is merely a tangential point that is not built in to the sociology
of dramaturgy itself. Specifically the meaning of action is never
explained to be problematic due to the inherent "free will," of the
individual, or that "free will" causes action to be problematic.
Rather, the meaning of action is explained to be problematic in terms
Qf an empirically grounded behaviorism. Put simply, action is said
to be problematic because responses from others and one's self are not
mechanically given but highly variable. The prob1ematics of action is
therefore given a strict sociological basis in dramaturgy. Since Mead,
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responses have been understood as being uncertain. ,"Why" this is so
is a moot point ,in dramaturgy. But it is'never said that it is
because of "free will."
16.

This understanding leads a defense to dramaturgy toward the criticism
by radical sociologists, namely Lichtman (1970; 1971) a~d Ho.rton
(1971) that, by emphasizing the phenomenological aspects of reality
as an on-going accomplishment, dramaturgy only amounts to a "do-it
yourself, apolitical stance which can only affirm (apologize) by end
lessly describing the reified construction of bourgeois reality"
(Horton, 1971:189). For instance, radicals argue that
It is not enough to know that the obj ect'ive appearance of ·real
ity is managed; we want to know also why that objectivity is so
oppressive and how it can be overcome (Horton, 1971:188).
Thus Horton (1971:188) argues
The Idramaturgica1] phenomenological method, whiie it contri
butes to a theoretical understanding of reification, is
clearly not a method for radical dereification, because it ,
cannot result in practical action against the reified social
world.
Ho:rton is arguing that dramaturgy can not result in "Praxis," which
is a social-psychology involved in the Marxian concept of "dialecti
cal thinking." Dialectical thought, which underlies Praxis, is
explained by Schroyer (1971:132) as
By first expressing what a totality holds itself to be, and
then confronting it with what it is, a [dialectical] theory
is able to break down the rigidity of the object.
On the basis of di'alectical thought, therefore, it is argued that
Praxis becomes possible; men' can not only see what "is" but what also
"should be."
The dramaturgical retort is that, in order to see what is, one can no
longer be concerned with the question "why?" This is simply because
the problem leads to infinite regression, and almost always ends in'
tautology. Tautology, by the way, is Marxist's and radical sociolo
gists' most common intellectual error. They are the most guilty of
explaining the meaning of behavior on the basis of "productive
forces," and "productive relations" which are both tautological reifi
cations of action itself (see, for example, Marx, 1961).
Dramaturgists would argue that to see what "is,tI which is the basis
of dialectical thought and Praxis, one must discontinue the endless
tendency to explain human actions on the basis of tautological inter
pretations of behavior itself. Tautology merely reinforces a misin
terpretation of what "is." The need, therefore, is for cogent
description of action in its own terms. Only in this way can the
fir.st moment of the dialectic, what "is," be comprehended. And. the
meaning of what "is,". is what the actions of individuals on-gQingly
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create, which is meaning. People have to be shown the creation of
their own powers and actions.
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